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“I have to get up at 4 a.m. and work up to 10 p.m. I 
wash the laundry, clean the house, do the dishes, buy 
things at the market, and look after the children. I am 
told I get GNF 15,000 [about $2.50] per month, but I 
have never seen that money. Shortly after I came, I fell 
sick. The lady accused me of faking it and refusing to 
work. Since that day, I have often been sick but I never 
say so. I am beaten. When I take too long here, I may 
be beaten. Whenever I want to take a rest, the lady 
says I did not come to rest, but to work, and beats me 
with an electric cord or a piece of tire and pulls my 
ears. It happens as soon as I take a break.” – 
Fourteen-year-old Thérèse I.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most abusive forms of child labor are often thought to be 
trafficking for sexual exploitation or excessive working hours in 
factories. While these labor abuses do exist, the reality is that some of 
the most abusive forms of child labor occur in the private homes of 
wealthy and middle-class families in the form of domestic work. If it is 
true that criminals are best deterred by the likelihood of apprehension,2 
then governments are complicit in some of the most abusive forms of 
child labor by their continued failure to appropriately regulate the 
domestic work industry and criminalize those that exploit child 
workers, as required by widely-ratified international conventions.3 
Due to the isolated environment of their job, domestic workers 
(“DW” or “DWs”) are inherently less able to organize, bargain, and 
push for improved legal protections. These problems are often 
compounded due to age, education, gender, socio-economic status, 
race, and migration status.4 Abuses are not relegated only to countries 
 
2. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, in CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 1975-2025 42 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013). 
3. See infra Section II.A. 
4. Peggie R. Smith, Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 161 (2011); see also Virginia 
Mantouvalou, Human Rights for Precarious Workers: The Legislative Precariousness of 
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with limited resources or governance: the worst forms of child labor, 
abusive working conditions, and human trafficking continue to occur 
in industrialized nations including the United States, France, and the 
Netherlands.5 Promulgation of the International Labour Organization’s 
(“ILO”) Convention 189 (“C189”) was an organizational success for 
domestic workers and their advocates, and it thrust regulation and 
oversight of the industry into the realm of State governments, who had 
long ignored or dismissed it.6 Despite this, domestic workers like 
Thérèse remain particularly vulnerable. Because they are still often 
seen as part of the informal labor force, many countries do not extend 
labor protections to domestic workers, particularly migrants.7 Nor do 
many countries effectively prosecute, investigate or even criminalize 
abuse of domestic workers.8 While twenty-four states ratified C189, 
the majority have not taken action at all.9 Prevention of the worst forms 
 
Domestic Labor, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 133, 138 (2012); Ana Virgínia et al., Regulatory 
Challenges of Domestic Work: The Case of Brazil 14 (LLDRL Working Paper Series, WP No. 
3, 2009). 
5. See generally SAMEERA HAVIZ & MICHAEL PAARLBERG, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES 
& NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALL., THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING OF DOMESTIC WORKERS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, FINDINGS FROM BEYOND THE SURVIVAL CAMPAIGN 10 (Narbada Chhetri 
et al., eds., 2017); see also Alexandra Ricard-Guay, Trafficking in Domestic Work: Looking at 
the Demand-Side 12 (DemandAT, Working Paper No. 5, Mar. 2016) (noting that child domestic 
labor has been identified in France and the Netherlands, though very little case law exists). 
6. See generally Einat Albin & Virginia Mantouvalou, The ILO Convention on Domestic 
Workers: From the Shadows to the Light, INDUS. L. J., Mar. 2012, at 67; see also Int’l. Labour 
Org. [ILO], Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent 
of Legal Protection 19 (2013). [hereinafter Domestic Workers Across the World]. 
7. There are many historical (U.S.) and contemporary (Lebanon and Saudi Arabia) 
examples of domestic workers being excluded from labor protections. Human Rights Watch, 
[HRW], Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers With Children Deported, (Apr. 25, 2017,12:01 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/25/lebanon-migrant-domestic-workers-children-
deported (“The estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are excluded from 
labor law protections”) [https://perma.cc/ZNL7-57Y7]; Human Rights Watch, [HRW], Saudi 
Arabia: Steps Toward Migrant Workers’ Rights (Nov. 15, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/15/saudi-arabia-steps-toward-migrant-workers-rights 
(“Saudi Arabia’s recent labor reforms may help curb rampant abuses, but they exclude domestic 
workers and institutionalize bias against women.”) [https://perma.cc/4BD9-AQ9Y]. For a brief 
discussion of the United States Fair Labor Standards Act and its exclusion of domestic workers, 
see Eileen Boris, Decent Work in the Home: Affect and Rights Talk, 15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L 
L. 79, 87 (2017). 
8. Ricard-Guay, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that very little case law on trafficking law 
exists, and that governments should broaden the scope of trafficking in persons statutes to 
effectively prosecute). 
9. See infra Section III.A. on Convention 189. 
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of abusive labor in domestic work can be complex, and touches human 
rights, criminal, labor, and immigration laws. 
In contrast to the lack of sympathy afforded to adult domestic 
workers, countries are overwhelmingly sympathetic to issues 
concerning the eradication of child labor. The UN Convention on the 
Rights of Child (“UNCRC”) has 196 parties and 140 signatories, and 
the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (“C182”) 
has 180 signatories.10 Many adult domestic workers share experiences 
similar to Thérèse’s.11 However, the extent of legal and social 
protections at their disposal may vary depending on their age. 
Child domestic work is not always the ‘worst form’ of child 
labor.12 The worst forms of child labor include compulsory labor or 
labor that may harm the health, safety, or morals of the child.13 
Therefore, in domestic work, the ‘worst forms’ of child labor are 
situations in which the child is not able to leave the employment 
situation because of force or coercion, or is subject to abusive 
 
10. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-
11&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter UNCRC] (alternatively referred to as UNCROC) 
[https://perma.cc/NWK8-F2LT]; Ratifications of C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 1999 (No. 182), INT’L. LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO (last visited 
May 14, 2018) [hereinafter Ratifications of C182] [https://perma.cc/Y82K-2NCG]. 
11. Abuse of domestic workers is distressingly common, and well (if sporadically) 
documented. For a report on the global status of abuse of domestic workers, see generally, 
Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19. For an overview of abusive labor 
conditions in Hong Kong, see JADE ANDERSON & VICTORIA WISNIEWSKI OTERO, JUSTICE 
CNT., COMING CLEAN: THE PREVALENCE OF FORCED LABOUR AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF FORCED LABOUR AMONGST MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG 
(Aideen McLaughlin, ed., 2016). 
12. ILO & Int’l Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, [IPEC], Ending Child 
Labour in Domestic Work and Protecting Young Workers from Abusive Working Conditions 6 
(2013) (“Under Convention No. 182, child domestic work was not explicitly defined as a worst 
form of child labour; however, it was acknowledged that some situations could be considered as 
worst forms of child labour”) [hereinafter Ending Child Labour]. The worst forms of child labor 
are: “(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of 
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or 
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering 
of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; 
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production 
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; (d) work which, by its 
nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals 
of children.” ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), art. 3(d), June 17, 
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter C182]. 
13. C182, supra note 12. 
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conditions that could harm their health and safety.14 In the worst cases, 
domestic work can amount to human trafficking.15 To eradicate these 
worst practices in child domestic labor, countries must adopt policies 
and frameworks for doing so – frameworks that would inherently 
improve protections for adult domestic workers.16 
Unlike factory work or agricultural work, domestic work takes 
place in a private home, making its regulation different from, and more 
challenging than, other industries. The ILO has suggested formalizing 
the domestic work economy to prevent abuse in the industry, for 
example by requiring written employment contracts and ensuring 
access to judicial mechanisms.17 These protections help to protect 
domestic workers against harmful and compelled working 
conditions.18 Human rights, including labor rights, are understood to be 
inherent to each individual.19 Therefore, excluding adult DWs from 
protective human rights regimes is not in keeping with the 
understanding that human rights apply equitably to all humans. It 
would be impractical, if not impossible, to require written employment 
contracts for children and not recognize the same contract once the 
worker reaches adult age.20 
 
14. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 14-24; see also C182, supra note 12. 
15. Depending on the jurisdiction and relevant statute, trafficking can involve transport 
across international borders, or can involve solely domestic activity. For example, in the United 
States, the definition of trafficking incorporates fraud and coercion, but not necessarily transport, 
as a means through which trafficking can be achieved. 22 U.S. § 7102 (9) (2014); HAVIZ & 
PAARLBERG, supra note 5, at 19-21; Hélène Harroff-Tavel & Alix Nasri, ILO, Tricked and 
Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East (2013) 41-43. 
16. See infra Section VI.A. 
17. Agustinus Beo Da Costa, Without Contracts, Domestic Workers’ Rights Unprotected, 
ILO, (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/fs/WCMS_464070/lang--
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/C82D-PX2A]; see also ILO, Resolution Concerning Decent 
Work and the Informal Economy, 90th Session of the General Conference ¶¶ 28-30 (2002) 
[hereinafter Resolution Concerning Decent Work]. 
18. Advocates have routinely requested these mechanisms to help prevent abusive 
employment practices. See Child Labour and Domestic Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Childdomesticlabour/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 14, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/Y5T4-JFA4]. 
19.  G.A. Res. 217 A(III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
Jean-Michel Servais, Universal Labor Standards and National Cultures, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 35, 36 (2004) (describing ILO activities as a “universal mandate”).  
20. This can be even more complicated considering that in many countries, particularly in 
rural areas, identity and birth date documents are not provided at birth. SARAH PAOLETTI ET AL., 
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL 44 (2014) Even where documents 
are available, they may be forged. Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, supra note 15, at 61. 
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Thus, preventing the worst forms of child domestic labor requires 
effective oversight of the industry as a whole. The most effective 
rights-based advocacy would cement the overlap between child labor 
and domestic work in the eyes of policy makers and the broader 
community. This Note argues that domestic worker advocates should 
utilize international legal frameworks and domestic law pertaining to 
eradication of the worst forms of child domestic labor to strengthen the 
rights of all domestic workers. 
The first objective of this Note is to solidify the connection 
between adult and child DWs within a human rights-based framework. 
The second objective is to argue that states must take steps to regulate 
the industry as a necessary component of their international legal 
obligations to eradicate the worst forms of child labor. Part II defines 
domestic work and domestic workers, and describes their historical role 
as informal caregivers. Part III introduces C189 and its accompanying 
Recommendation 201 (“R201”), Convention 182 on the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Part IV discusses the legislative precariousness of domestic workers 
and elucidates the particular difficulties in regulating the domestic 
work industry. Part V highlights the primary legal differences between 
adult and child DWs. This Part then describes the numerous similarities 
between the two groups to establish a foundation for the approach 
advocated in Part VI. Part VI uses the commonalities shared by child 
and adult DWs to propose that countries should act on their obligations 
to honor and protect particular human rights. This Part also addresses 
the hypocrisy of countries who desire ‘on paper’ to protect the most 
vulnerable child workers, while failing to implement policies and legal 
mechanisms that would oversee the domestic work industry, in which 
so many children are kept in abusive forms of child labor. Finally, in 
Part VII, this Note provides three broad avenues through which 
advocates can push their governments to protect domestic workers 
from the worst forms of abusive labor. 
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM – CHALLENGES IN DEFINING 
AND PROTECTING DOMESTIC LABORERS 
Though global trends are moving towards the formalization of 
domestic work, the lines between domestic work and informal work 
can be unclear. It is therefore first necessary to define domestic work, 
domestic workers, child domestic workers, and their advocates. These 
definitions require a brief review of the social history of the domestic 
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work industry as informal work, or an economic activity that is 
insufficiently covered by formal legal or practical arrangements.21 
A. Defining Domestic Work 
Nearly a century passed between the creation of the International 
Labour Organization in 191922 and the formal recognition of domestic 
workers’ rights in 2011 in the form of C189 on Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers.23 One of many reasons for the delay is the intimate 
nature of the domestic work and workplace.24 C189 defines a domestic 
worker as someone who performs work in or for a household or 
households.25 
Though C189 provides a definition of domestic work, identifying 
domestic work in practice can be a challenge. In many communities, 
children perform domestic work such as cooking, cleaning, and child 
care for younger siblings or others as a necessary and accepted part of 
life.26 In impoverished communities, children, often female, are tasked 
with caring for their families or others, sometimes earning a small wage 
to assist their parents in providing for their families.27 Even in wealthy 
countries, domestic duties are often assigned to women without 
 
21. Resolution Concerning Decent Work, supra note 17, ¶ 3. 
22. Origins and History, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/history/lang—en/index.htm (last visited March 17, 2018). 
23. ILO, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), 15A/2, PR No. 15A, (June 16, 
2011) [hereinafter C189]. 
24. Manuela Tomei, Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Reflections on Recent 
Approaches to Tackle Informality, 23 CAN. J. WOMEN & L., 185, 207 (2011). 
25. C189, supra note 23, art. (1)(a)-(b). 
26. For more on sibling care, see REKHA MEHRA ET AL., CHILD CARE OPTIONS FOR 
WORKING MOTHERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (n.d.), 41-42 (noting that women often left 
children in the care of other daughters). 
27. “However, across countries and regions, the tasks undertaken by child domestic 
workers tend to be divided according to traditional gender roles. This means that girls are usually 
required to do ‘indoor’ tasks such as cooking, cleaning and washing, as well as taking on the 
‘caring’ roles, such as looking after young children and the elderly.” Jonathan Blagbrough, Anti-
Slavery Int’l, They Respect Their Animals More: Voices of Child Domestic Workers 17 ( (2007). 
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payment.28 The fight for recognition of domestic work as work29 has 
its roots in gendered beliefs that domestic work is done out of love and 
affection, rather than as a means of sustenance.30 
Domestic work is still often seen as part of the informal economy, 
as opposed to the formal labor force. The US National Labor Relations 
Act, for example, explicitly excludes any individual undertaking work 
or service in the home.31 Domestic work is sometimes seen as training 
for a woman’s future role as a mother.32 This perception leads to a 
danger of commodification of women’s labor.33 This is particularly 
true when a domestic worker lives with her employer, as she gives up 
various freedoms that would come with living on her own.34 
Even the ILO has historically failed to adequately protect 
domestic workers on par with other workers through its international 
conventions. Though some conventions expressly includ domestic 
service within their scope, many permitt the exclusion of domestic 
 
28. The United States is one of many examples of this. Hila Shamir, Between Home and 
Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of Employment Law in Markets of Care, 30 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 404, 455-56 (2009); see Bryce Covert, Putting a Price Tag on Unpaid 
Housework, FORBES (May 30, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brycecovert/2012/05/30/
putting-a-price-tag-on-unpaid-housework/#1dcea8a835c6 [https://perma.cc/4C7M-EZHK]; see 
also Rebecca M. Horne et al., Time, Money, or Gender? Predictors of the Division of Household 
Labour Across Life Stages, SEX ROLES (2017) (finding that women assume more housework 
than their male counterparts across all age groups). 
29. This phrase describes the conception of domestic work as work like any other 
formalized industry, as opposed to domestic labor performed outside of a formal employment 
relationship and in the privacy of the home. Asha D’Souza, Int’l Labour Org., Moving Towards 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers: An Overview of the ILO’s Work, 23, 73, 81, (working 
Paper 2/2010, 2010).  
30. Boris, supra note 7, at 83; see also Int’l Labour Conference, [ILC], Report IV(1)- 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers, ¶ 18 (June 16, 2010) (referring to domestic work as a 
“labour of love”) [hereinafter Report IV(1)]. 
31. United States National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1935). 
32. ILO & IPEC, Ending Child Labor, supra note 12, at 2. 
33. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 164; Shamir, supra note 28, at 434-43. 
34. For example, some employers with live-in domestic workers restrict their freedom to 
come and go as they please by setting curfews, restricting the time and ability of the worker to 
entertain friends at the home or use resources at the home such as the internet or air conditioning, 
and restricting private space by requiring the domestic worker to share a room or sleep in a space 
used during the day. See Tom Grundy, Hong Kong Domestic Workers Made to Live in 
Bathrooms, Closets, on Balconies and Roofs, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (May 10, 2017, 19:45), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/05/10/hong-kong-domestic-workers-made-to-live-in-
bathrooms-closets-on-balconies-and-roofs/ [https://perma.cc/4ZLM-7HKP]; see also Jun Pang, 
HONG KONG FREE PRESS Aug. 14, 2017, 10:53), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/14/employer-who-prevented-domestic-worker-from-
using-air-con-cyberbullied-says-rights-group/ [https://perma.cc/NK6B-7TK2]. 
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workers through ‘flexibility clauses.’35 The Dominican Republic 
refused to extend the 1990 Night Work Convention no. 171 to DWs. 
Likewise, the Netherlands refused to extend the 1994 Part-time Work 
Convention no. 175 to DWs.36 States including Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, 
France, Guyana, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia refused to extend the 
1970 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131 to DWs.37 The 
language of minimum wage statutes in countries including Guatemala, 
the Republic of Korea, Lebanon, the Netherlands, and Sri Lanka also 
seem to implicitly exclude domestic workers from the minimum wage 
in breach of Convention 131’s procedural requirements.38 
B. A Background on Adult & Child Domestic Workers 
Understanding DWs requires understanding the social 
underpinnings of how communities value their work. Women account 
for eighty-three percent  of all domestic workers,39 and globally one in 
every thirteen female wage workers is a domestic worker, a 7.5 percent 
total.40 A domestic worker is defined as a person who performs work 
in or for a household or households, while a child domestic worker is 
someone who does this work and is between the ages of 5 and 17.41 
This Note uses the term “domestic worker” to refer to all those who 
perform work in or for a household(s), regardless of age. Children who 
perform chores or unpaid work in their own household are not included 
in this definition.42 
 
35. Flexibility clauses typically require notice of exclusion at the time of ratification.  
ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 169. 
36. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 20. 
37. Id. at 22. 
38. Id. (“Guatemala, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, the Netherlands and Sri Lanka seem to 
exclude domestic workers from the scope of the minimum wage legislation without a clear 
indication of fulfilment of procedural requirements under Art. 1, para. 3, of Convention No. 
131.”). 
39. For this reason and the sake of simplicity, I use feminine pronouns when discussing 
domestic workers, while still recognizing that male domestic workers are included in these 
figures. 
40. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19. 
41. C189, supra note 23, art. (1)(a-b); ‘Child labor’ can have different definitions based 
on the type of work and age of the child. See What is Child Labor, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 14, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/P6PA-WNKN]. Here I use the term ‘child domestic worker’ to refer to anyone 
below the age of 18 undertaking domestic work.  
42. C189, supra note 23 art. (1)(c). 
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Though domestic work can provide a valuable entry point into the 
gainful labor market, poor working conditions and inadequate legal 
protections disproportionately affect women and help to perpetuate 
gender and wage disparities.43 During the 1970s, feminists in the 
United States led the charge against discrimination in the employment 
of women.44 Following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1970s the 
devaluing of particular types of work was also framed around race.45 A 
US Senator on the Labor and Education Committee in the 1970s noted 
that “the lack of respect accorded domestics is in many ways an 
unfortunate reflection of the value we place on the traditional role of 
women in our society.”46 
It is important to briefly note here the role that lack of workable 
and affordable child and elderly care options plays in the continued 
reliance on domestic workers for care work.47 The US labor market for 
example, makes it difficult for unskilled women to find jobs with 
salaries sufficient to cover childcare.48 Lack of child care alternatives 
 
43. Smith, supra note 4, at 161; see also ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 63. For more 
on wage disparities see Bangladesh Shishu Adhikar Forum, [BASF], Hidden Slavery: Child 
Domestic Work,  47 (Mar. 2016) (noting that in a study conducted in Bangladesh, for all ages 
ranges, male child domestic workers made more than their female counterparts). 
44. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS 
IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 130 (2012). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (quoting Senator Harrison Arlington Williams Jr. (D-NJ)). 
47. See DANIEL A. BELL, CHINA’S NEW CONFUCIANISM: POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 72 (2008) (noting that in Hong Kong, preference for foreign domestic 
workers may be explained by lack of quality daycare); Arijit Nandi et al., 
The Effect of an Affordable Daycare Program on Health and Economic Well-being in Rajasthan, 
India: Protocol for a Cluster-Randomized Impact Evaluation Study, 16 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH, 
no. 460, 2016, at 1, 2 (noting that the provision of affordable daycare has the potential to reduce 
gender inequality by allowing poor women to join the labor force); ABIGAIL BESS BAKAN & 
DAIVA K. STASIULIS, NOT ONE OF THE FAMILY: FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CANADA 
107 (1997) (arguing that the Canadian government should recognize the lack of affordable child 
care and allow tax deductions for the employment of domestic workers); Rachel Moussié, 
WIEGO, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic Development, 
Child Care from the Perspective of Women in the Informal Economy 1 (Sep. 2016) (noting that 
childcare is inaccessible to and unaffordable for low paid workers, contributing to the cycle of 
poverty); NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., LISTENING TO WORKERS: CHILD CARE CHALLENGES IN 
LOW WAGE JOBS 5 (June 2014) (noting that women in the United States tend to rely on informal 
care by friends, family, or neighbors due to the lack of affordable care options). 
48. Shamir, supra note 28, at 440-41; see also Daniela Del Boca, The Impact of Child 
Care Costs and Availability on Mothers’ Labor Supply 15 (ImPRovE Working Paper No. 15/04, 
2015) (“In the U.S. . . . mothers’ labor supply is quite sensitive to costs variations.”). 
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may cause an employer to call for domestic workers to work long 
hours. 
Domestic workers tend to migrate from poorer areas to wealthier 
ones.49 In addition to the type of work they undertake, domestic 
workers are rendered uniquely vulnerable because of an intersection of 
migration, education, race, socio-economic status and often gender.50 
Employers of domestic workers are often women, “characterized by a 
difference of status that the latter is often keen to maintain.”51 This 
further reflects the perception that home and care work is the 
responsibility of women.52 
The origins of labor law conceptualized work or labor as 
industrialized labor,53 rather than caring work, which was a historically 
female role and one that continues to be undertaken by women.54 
Emotional, physical, and sexual abuse are commonly committed 
against domestic workers, particularly those that live with employers.55 
In Brazil, domestic workers are second largest group of female 
domestic violence victims after housewives.56 
Without effective support to help break workers out of poverty, 
domestic work becomes cyclical, as women pass the role onto their 
 
49. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 2 (“For the majority, a common cross-cutting 
factor influencing their engagement in child domestic work – for both girls and boys – is the 
extent of the social exclusion and relative poverty of their families and communities.”); see also 
Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 29 (“In general, local domestic workers 
are younger, come from poorer areas.”); id. at 21 (“Domestic workers generally migrate within 
the region, generally from poorer to more prosperous countries.”). 
50. Smith, supra note 4, at 165 (“Likewise when women enter receiving countries to work 
as domestics, they are commonly relegated to an unequal position in society based on their 
gender, race, and class identity.”). 
51. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 138. 
52. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 25. 
53. For example, the US Department of Labor was created in 1913 as a response to poor 
conditions in factories. A women’s bureau within the Department was created in 1920, 
indicating that the original conception of labor did not necessarily include women’s work. Public 
Law No. 259 of June 5, 1920, https://www.dol.gov/wb/info_about_wb/interwb.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8V97-PEW5].  
54. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
55. See infra Part V.B.5. on ‘emotional, physical and sexual abuse.’ 
56. Virginia et al., supra note 4, at 15. For more on violence against domestic workers in 
Brazil, see Creuza Oliveira, A Domestic Worker in Brazil, Real Life Stories, UN, 
http://www.un.org/en/letsfightracism/oliveira.shtml [https://perma.cc/8BZL-BBC9]; (last 
visited May 14, 2018). See also Virginia Mantouvalou, What Is to Be Done for Migrant 
Domestic Workers?, in LABOUR MIGRATION IN HARD TIMES: REFORMING LABOUR MARKET 
REGULATION? 141 (Bernard Ryan ed., 2013) (noting that abuse is distressingly common among 
migrant workers). 
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children. Many Sri Lankan women undertake domestic work in Middle 
Eastern countries and leave their children with extended family 
members, for whom the children work.57 Other contributing factors that 
lead children into domestic work include lack of educational 
opportunities, fleeing a forced marriage, domestic violence, 
displacement, or the loss of a family member from conflict or disease.58 
In addition to explicit exclusions from a number of ILO 
Conventions, domestic workers are often excluded from labor laws that 
would protect an industrial worker.59 The home countries from which 
migrant workers come are called ‘origin countries’, and the countries 
they migrate to are ‘destination countries’. Migrant Domestic Workers 
(“MDWs”) may even be subject to different labor standards than other 
migrants.60 DWs may be less likely to expose abuse, pursue a legal case 
against employers, or leave an abusive employer if they could be 
exposed to deportation, a countersuit or criminal proceedings.61 This 
fear effectively limits their access to the justice system.62 
Some jurisdictions have restrictive visa regimes for domestic 
workers. For example, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council63 
utilize the Kafala64 sponsorship system, which links immigration status 
 
57. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP ON CHILD DOMESTIC LABOUR AND TRADE 
UNIONS: REPORT 38 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP]. 
58. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 9. 
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 60. For more on statutory exclusions see 
supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
60. For more on statutory exclusions see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
61. See HAVIZ & PAARLBERG, supra note 5, at 6, 30 (noting that 78% of interviewees 
reported that their employers threatened them with deportation if they complained about work 
conditions, but that law HB493/SB178 in Maryland expanded the definition of extortion to 
include employers who threaten to report a worker’s immigration status); see also infra note 65 
on the Kafala system. 
62. See generally Human Rights Watch, Hidden Away: Abuses against Migrant Domestic 
Workers in the UK 38-48 (Mar. 30, 2014) (“The fear of deportation is a strong deterrent for them 
to report abuse by their employer.”). For a discussion of non-authorized migration see THE 
RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (Virginia Mantouvalou ed., 
2015) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO WORK]. 
63. The Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE"). Charter of the Co-operation Council for 
the Arab States of the Gulf (with Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council, of the Ministerial 
Council and of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes), Bahr.-Kuwait-Oman-Qatar-Saudi 
Arabia-U.A.E., May 25, 1981, 1288 U.N.T.S. 151. 
64. Also spelled Kefala or niẓām al-kafāla. 
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to a particular employer.65 This gives the employer complete control 
over the employee’s ability to change employment or leave the 
country.66 
Finally, non-legal problems such as political and cultural barriers 
prevent domestic workers from reporting abuse.67 Where abuse is 
reported, legal mechanisms that fail to account for differences in 
education, language skills, and financial circumstances can be 
ineffective.68 The culmination of these various identities and lack of 
accommodating policies creates social and legal hurdles that can be 
nearly impossible for domestic workers to overcome. 
This Note uses the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘advocates’ broadly to 
incorporate all those working towards improved conditions in the 
domestic work industry. Primarily, advocates are trade unions, civil 
society organizations, international human rights organizations and 
domestic workers themselves. Secondarily, advocates include 
government bodies, think tanks, and academics. Advocacy, as used in 
this Note, involves a wide variety of methods, including campaigns, 
awareness raising, research, academic studies and impact litigation, 
among others. These terms are used to give context and color to the 
groups and individuals whom have been responsible for DWs’ past 
international and domestic legislative successes. 
 
65. The Kafala System is a method of strictly controlling the foreign labor force. In Kafala, 
an employer applies for, dictates and controls the terms of stay for a domestic employee, creating 
a large power differential. The system was introduced to restrict migration from less wealthy 
Arab countries to the UAE, and workers of African or Asian origin were considered “more 
docile” and thus preferred. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants, The Kafala: Research on the 
Impact and Relation of the Sponsorship System to Migrant Labor Bondage in GCC Countries 
24-26 (Sept. 2014). 
66. Id. at 24; see also Migrant Forum Asia, Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala 
System 1. 
67. Int’l Labour Office, Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the 
Migrant Workers Instruments, ¶ 489, 105th Session (2016) (“[I]nformation provided by a 
number of trade unions stating that it is unreasonable to expect migrant workers to enforce their 
rights through the court system without provision of specific assistance . . . the [International 
Trade Union Confederation] referred to practical challenges migrant workers may face, such as 
limited language skills, inability to meet legal fees and lack of understanding of the country’s 
legal system.”). 
68. Id. (noting that granting access to justice is the duty of a State, and it is unreasonable 
to expect domestic workers who may lack language and financial resources to access it without 
assistance).  
69. C189, supra note 23, preamble. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Part III covers international law and its provisions that are most 
relevant to domestic workers. C189, promulgated in 2011, serves as the 
primary source of international law regarding labor standards for 
domestic workers. C189 is accompanied by R201, which elaborates on 
C189’s underlying rights. Two conventions are of particular relevance 
to the eradication of domestic child labor: The UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the ILO Convention 182 on the Eradication of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
A. Convention 189 
C189 was promulgated to recognize the undervalued and invisible 
domestic work undertaken primarily by women and girls. 69 Though 
domestic work was long considered to be the domain of the private 
home, as more women enter the labor force,70 demand for domestic 
work has grown, reaching 52.6 million workers in 2010. 71 The 
improved ease of migration and improvement of technology facilitating 
the sending of remittances makes migrating for domestic work easier 
than ever before. Since the early 2000s, high profile cases helped to 
shine a light on abuse of domestic workers, particularly where they 
were brought to developed countries by foreign diplomats.72 
Technology has also helped push domestic workers’ rights to the fore 
by enabling DWs to document abuses on cellphones.73 
The ILO first considered legislating on domestic workers in 1948, 
and again in 1965, however this never came to fruition.74 Instead, 
during sessions in 1948 and 1965 the Committees settled on passing 
resolutions related to the employment of domestic work.75 In 2007, a 
 
69. C189, supra note 23, preamble. 
70. Smith, supra note 4, at 163. 
71. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 24. 
72. See Frank Langfitt, Servants: Diplomat Held Us as Suburban ‘Slaves’ NPR, Mar. 1, 
2007; see also Jo Becker, Strip Search Uproar: What about the Nanny, CNN, Dec. 19, 2013. 
See also Steve George, Bangladeshi Diplomat in US Accused of Forcing Servant to Work 
Without Pay, CNN, June 4, 2017. 
73. See, e.g., Meredith McBride, Hong Kong: Abused Maid Erwiana Says Employer 
Should Get Life in Prison, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT, Feb. 11, 2015. 
74. Leila Kawar, Making the Machine Work: Technocratic Engineering of Rights for 
Domestic Workers at the International Labour Organization, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
483, 495 (2014). 
75. ILC, Report IV (1), supra note 30, ¶ 5. 
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brief to the ILO Governing Body highlighted the link between domestic 
work and its ‘decent work agenda’, which prioritized the elimination 
of discrimination in employment, the elimination of forced labor, and 
the abolition of child labor.76 The brief noted that the incidence of child 
labor in domestic work was widespread and that “girls dominate in 
domestic work.”77 The brief specifically contemplates an additional 
Convention protecting the nearly 100 million global workers under the 
age of 18 which would complement C182 and C138, the Minimum Age 
Convention.78 C189 recognizes that child domestic workers, migrant 
workers, and live-in workers are at particular risk of exploitation.79 
These early movements of C189 show its inherent links to the ILO’s 
goal of eradicating child labor. 
Some employer groups,80 where they existed, were opposed to the 
creation of a Convention, and disliked standard-setting in the area, 
particularly around the provision of social security and labor 
inspections.81 An ILO delegate from Bangladesh doubted whether 
employers of domestic workers were sophisticated enough in their 
legal knowledge to comply with international labor standards.82 
Further, traditionalists at the ILO found the suggestion of setting 
domestic work standards as “unexpected and puzzling.”83 
Despite these hesitations, in the first five years after C189 was 
promulgated, over seventy ILO member states have taken steps to 
improve the situation of domestic workers within their borders.84 
 
76. Kawar, supra note 74, at 495. 
77. ILO, Agenda of the International Labour Conference: Proposals for the Agenda of the 
99th Session (2010) of the Conference, ¶ 54, GB.300/2/2 (Nov. 2007). 
78.  Id. ¶ 63. 
79. C189, supra note 23, preamble. 
80. Little information is available about exactly who makes up these employer groups. See 
Kawar, supra note 74, at 496. 
81. Id. 
82. Boris, supra note 7, at 97-98. 
83. Kawar, supra note 74, at 497. 
84. ILO, Implementation of International Labour Standards for Domestic Workers, Aug, 
2017, 1 [hereinafter Implementation of International Labour Standards]; see also Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-protrav/—-
travail/documents/genericdocument/wcms_313678.pdf (listing the countries that have taken 
action on C189 as of 2013); ILO, Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms in the 
Domestic Work Sector Introductory Guide (2016) at 19 (noting that 70 states have taken steps 
to improve protections for domestic workers, thanks to a campaign by the International Trade 
Union Confederation to push for countries to ratify C189) [hereinafter Labour Inspection and 
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Thirty states successfully adopted reforms to extend labor and legal 
protections to domestic workers and eighteen are considering 
extending protections.85 The remaining twenty-four countries have 
signed and ratified C189.86 Since ratification, the ILO has provided 
assistance to at least sixty countries on the formation of bilateral treaties 
covering domestic labor, child labor, and forced labor.87  Noticeably 
absent from the signatories list are many destination countries for 
migrant domestic labor: primarily developed economies in Asia and the 
Middle East.88 None of the ‘Kafala’ countries have ratified C189.89 
1. Successes of C189 
C189 formally recognizes the rights of domestic workers for the 
first time. It includes comprehensive obligations spanning economic, 
social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.90 Bringing 
domestic workers into the ILO’s tripartite system benefits domestic 
workers, who lack a voice in policy-making because of inequalities in 
bargaining power.91 C189 also brings domestic work within the ILO’s 
Decent Work Agenda, an initiative to secure the right to decent work 
 
Other Compliance Mechanisms]. For more on the ITUC’s 12 by 12 Campaign, see Ending Child 
Labour, supra note 12, at 54. 
85. See Implementation of International Labour Standards, supra note 84, at 1. 
86. See Ratifications of C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUME
NT_ID:2551460 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (noting that the following countries have ratified 
C189: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Guinea, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Switzerland, and Uruguay) 
[https://perma.cc/4FDN-GSNF]. 
87. Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Achievements since the adoption of C189 2 (June 
14, 2016). It is difficult to hypothesize as to the low, or slow, rate of C189 ratification as little 
literature exists on the topic. It is possible that some countries lack unions or mass movements 
to encourage ratification. One possibility is that ILO ratification tends to be lower in Africa and 
parts of Asia, where greater portions of the economy are informal. Evance Kalula, Juliana 
Masabo & Marius Oliver, Informality, Employment and Social Protection: Some Critical 
Perspectives for/from Developing Countries, July 2012. 
88. Including countries with large numbers of migrant domestic workers, such as the UAE 
with over 750,000 migrant domestic workers and Kuwait with 620,000. See Migrant Rights 
Statistics – Domestic Workers in the Gulf, Migrant Rights Org. (2018), https://www.migrant-
rights.org/statistic/domesticworkers/ [https://perma.cc/E2MK-RCUA]. 
89. The Countries using the Kafala system of migration are the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. See Migrant Forum Asia, supra note 66. 
90. See generally C189, supra note 23. 
91. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note, at 40. 
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for all workers.92 The Decent Work Agenda involves ILO monitoring 
and assessment, data collection, policy analysis, and country profiling 
for compliance.93 Article 7 of C189 requires that DWs be informed of 
their work terms and conditions, preferably through written contracts.94 
Thus, the Convention could move workers from the informal sector 
into a formal work situation.95 Additionally, these rights have begun to 
be incorporated in other ILO instruments.96 
2. Shortcomings of C189 
The definition of domestic work “within an employment 
relationship” has been criticized due to the occasionally ambiguous 
nature of an employment relationship.97 The ILO defines employment 
as “performing some work for wage or salary in cash or in kind.”98 This 
can be problematic in the domestic work industry where benefits are 
given, but not explicitly exchanged for work. For example, a young 
woman working in her aunt’s home may receive lodging or food. 
Though this could be considered an ‘in kind’ benefit, her aunt could 
argue that such benefits are not conditional on the working relationship, 
and therefore the situation would fall outside the legal definition of an 
employment relationship. Employers could thus abuse this definition 
 
92. Tomei, supra note 24, at 186-87. 
93. See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG - MEASURING DECENT WORK, http://www.ilo.org/
integration/themes/mdw/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
94. C189, supra note 23, art. 23 VII (“Each Member shall take measures to ensure that 
domestic workers are informed of their terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate, 
verifiable and easily understandable manner and preferably, where possible, through written 
contracts in accordance with national laws, regulations or collective agreements.”). 
95. Sandra Fredman, Home from Home: Migrant Domestic Workers and the International 
Labour Organization Convention on Domestic Workers, in MIGRANTS AT WORK: 
IMMIGRATION AND VULNERABILITY IN LABOUR LAW 408 (Cathryn Costello & Mark Freedland 
eds., 2014) (“the Convention might facilitate some movement of workers from informal and 
uncertain work arrangements to a more formal situation. However, as is well known, employers 
are adept at producing documents which disguise relationships to avoid regulation”). 
96. For example, ILO Recommendation 204 on the Transition from the Informal to the 
Informal Economy in Section 4(c) includes “paid domestic workers employed by households.” 
ILO, Recommendation 204 – Recommendation Concerning the Transition from the Informal to 
the Formal Economy §4(c), June 12, 2015. 
97.  Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 145 (noting that the definition “within an employment 
relationship” excludes those employed on a casual basis). 
98.  Glossary of Statistical Terms, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2018), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=778 [https://perma.cc/3K28-
9ZEU]. 
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to conceal employment relationships.99 Additionally, C189’s definition 
excludes those not in an employment relationship,100 which effectively 
excludes DWs working for agencies, who are self-employed, or work 
on a casual basis.101 
C189 uses primarily non-binding language. For example, Article 
9 states that domestic workers are ‘free to reach an agreement’ with 
their employers on whether to reside in the home.102 This falls short of 
asserting that a DW has the right to live away from the place of 
employment. Employers cannot be held directly accountable under 
C189. While C189 requires that States shall provide enforcement 
mechanisms against abusive employment agencies, it makes no 
mention of what these may look like.103 Agencies commit a variety of 
abuses against migrant domestic workers, including confiscation of 
travel documents and wages.104 C189 requires simply that States 
provide penalties for abusive agencies.105 It does not demand that 
signatories make changes to how employers or agencies are held 
accountable.106 
3. Recommendation 201 
While C189 is a binding document, R201 is an accompanying and 
non-binding recommendation that further clarifies the nature of the 
 
99. Maggie Black, Child Domestic Workers: a handbook on good practice in programme 
interventions, Anti-Slavery International, 59 (2005). Anti-Slavery International points out that 
distinctions must be drawn between ‘fostering’ children and ‘adopting’ them, the latter of which 
would require equal treatment with the household’s other children. The lack of a legal distinction 
could amount to a family member being treated as labor, without payment.  
100. See C189, supra note 23, art. 3(3). 
101. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 145. 
102. See C189, supra note 23, art 9.  
103. See C189, supra note 23.  
104. See Elizabeth Frantz, Breaking the Isolation: Access to Information and Media 
Among Migrant Domestic Workers in Jordan and Lebanon 4, Open Society Foundations, (Feb. 
23, 2014) (“Recruitment agencies and employers routinely confiscate the passports of 
migrants”); see also Peggy W.Y. Lee & Carole J. Petersen, Forced Labour and Debt Bondage 
in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers, at 15, 27 
(“Agencies routinely charge six months wages, arranging with the employer to divert to them 
the helper’s wages . . . When an employment agent or employer confiscates the passport of a 
MDW, it gains an element of control and ownership that can turn an abusive employment 
situation into a form of slavery.”). 
105. See C189, supra note 23, art. 15(1)(c). 
106. See C189, art. 15 (requiring only that governments oversee agencies by providing 
complaint mechanisms, criminalize abuse of domestic workers by agencies, and ensure that 
agency fees are not directly deducted from a DW’s remuneration). 
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rights detailed in C189.107 C189 and R201 are designed to be read 
together, as the latter expands upon the provisions of the Convention.108 
R201 requires states to identify the worst forms of child domestic labor 
and pay special attention to the needs of domestic workers under the 
age of 18.109 
B. The Eradication of Child Labor 
The application of human rights to children is a relatively recent 
concept.110 The eradication of the worst forms of child labor has been 
addressed in international conventions and declarations, particularly 
ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child.111 Domestic work has been 
linked with widely-disparaged labor practices including human 
trafficking and the worst forms of child labor.112 The nearly universal 
ratification of these treaties provides a strong base for greater 
legislative protection of domestic workers, as opposed to other 
prominent human rights conventions. 
1. Convention 182 
C182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour is one of the most 
widely-ratified ILO conventions, with 180 ratifications.113 C182 uses 
binding language requiring that State parties “shall take immediate and 
effective measures” to fulfill its mandate.114 Given the high ratification 
rate of C182, countries have affirmative obligations to protect child 
workers that fall under its mandate. C182 calls on governments to 
 
107. ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Convention 189 & Recommendation 201 
at a Glance, Int’l Labour Office of Geneva 7 (2011) [hereinafter R201]. 
108. Id. 
109. ILO, Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Art 5(1)-(2), 
15B/2, PR No. 15B (June 16, 2011). 
110. ILO, Tackling Child Labour in Domestic Work: A Handbook for Action, Int’l Labour 
Org. & Int’l Domestic Workers Fed’n., 68 (2017) [hereinafter Tackling Child Labour]. 
111.  See C182, supra note 12; UNCRC, supra note 10.  
112. See Paul Vitello, From Stand in Long Island Slavery Case, a Snapshot of a Hidden 
U.S. Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2007); see also Human Rights Watch, Protect 15 Million 
Child Domestic Workers (Feb. 25, 2013). 
113. Ratifications of C182, supra note 12. 
114. C182, supra note 12, art. I. 
2018] PROTECTIONS FOR PRECARIOUS AND CDWS 1355 
prioritize the abolition of the worst forms of child labor in their 
attempts to eradicate child labor completely.115 
Domestic legislation regulating the employment of children often 
exists on the books, but domestic work may be excluded.116 In the mid-
2000s a number of major human rights organizations published studies 
on the intersection between the worst forms of child labor and domestic 
work. Human Rights Watch produced a report in 2006 titled “Swept 
under the Rug: Abuses against Domestic Workers Around the World,” 
which found that laws prohibiting abusive child domestic labor were 
poorly enforced.117 Anti-Slavery International also conducted research 
on domestic workers in the Middle East in the same year and found that 
girls as young as five were doing domestic work.118 In 2005, Anti-
Slavery International listed practices through which domestic work 
could contribute to the worst forms of child labor, in contravention of 
C182 and its accompanying Recommendation 190.119 These include 
circumstances in which a child is helping pay off a parent’s debt, when 
a child is under fourteen-years-old, or when a child is forced to work 
excessive hours.120 
Article 3 of C189 clearly lists one of its goals as the effective 
abolition of child labor.121 C189 complements some provisions in C138 
on Minimum Age and C182, for example Article 4 of C189 requires a 
minimum age be set for domestic work consistent with those 
Conventions.122 R201 also requires the identification, prohibition and 
elimination of hazardous domestic work by children, and 
implementation of monitoring systems to prevent this.123 
Article 7 (2) of C182 requires a ratifying state to take effective 
measures to prevent child labor by providing direct assistance for 
removal of children from the worst forms of child labor, ensuring 
 
115. The complete eradication of child labor is called for in Convention 138. ILO, 
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, preamble (June 19, 1976). 
116. Black, supra note 99, at 59. 
117. Human Rights Watch, Swept Under the Rug, Vol. 18, Number 7(C) (2006). 
118. Anti-Slavery International, Trafficking in Women Forced Labour and Domestic Work 
in the Context of the Middle East and Gulf Region, at 18-19 (2006); see also Celia Mather, 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing, [WIEGO] “Yes, We Did It!” 
How the World’s Domestic Workers Won Their International Rights and Recognition (2000). 
119. Black, supra note 99, at 6. 
120. Id. 
121. C189, supra note 23, art. 3(2)(c). 
122. Id. art. 4. 
123. R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2). 
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access to basic education, identifying and reaching out to children at 
special risk and taking “into account the special situation of girls”.124 
Therefore, where children are found at particular risk in domestic work, 
C182 requires states to take effective measures to identify and reach 
out to them.125 Because of the high prevalence of girls in the industry, 
states are further required to take into account the role of females in 
domestic work.126 
2. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Child is a binding document 
with 196 parties.127 Only the United States has not ratified the 
agreement, though it has signed it.128 Though many provisions of 
UNCRC are applicable to child domestic workers (“CDWs”),129 
UNCRC Article 32 in particular prohibits work that is hazardous, 
interferes with education or is otherwise harmful to the child’s health 
or mental, moral or social development.130 Article 32 also requires 
governments to undertake administrative, legislative and social 
measures to ensure appropriate hours and conditions for 
employment.131 This includes penalties or sanctions for those found to 
 
124. C182, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(a)-(e). 
125. Id. art. (7)(d). 
126. Id. art. (7)(e). 
127. UNCRC, supra note 10. 
128. Id. at 3. 
129. Rights relevant to child domestic workers in the UNCRC include: The right to non-
discrimination, on grounds of ethnic or social origin, birth or other status (Article 2); The right 
to be cared for by his or her parents (Article 7); The right to preserve identity, nationality, name 
and family relations (Article 8); The right to maintain regular contact with parents if separated 
from them (Article 9); The right not to be illicitly transferred abroad (Article 11); The right to 
express views in all matters affecting her/himself (Article 12); The right to freedom of 
association (Article 15); The right to be brought up by parents or guardians whose basic concern 
is his or her best interests (Article 18); The right to protection from physical or mental ill-
treatment, neglect or exploitation (Article 19); The right to benefit from the highest attainable 
standard of health and access to health care services (Article 24); The right to social security, 
including social insurance in accordance with national law (Article 26); The right to conditions 
of living necessary for his or her development (Article 27); The right to education (Article 28); 
The right to rest, leisure, play and recreation (Article 31); The right to protection from all forms 
of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (Article 34); The right to protection from abduction, sale 
or trafficking (Article 35); and The right to protection from cruel or degrading treatment, and 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Article 37). ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 
57, at 26. 
130. UNCRC, supra note 10, art. 32(1). 
131. Id. art. 32(2). 
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violate the article.132 A possible penalty could be the criminalization of 
private conduct that breaches this Article. UNCRC further prohibits 
prejudicial exploitation of any sort.133 
IV. ‘LEGISLATIVE PRECARIOUSNESS’ - HISTORICAL 
SHORTCOMINGS OF DESTINATION COUNTRY LEGISLATION  
The nature of domestic work as described in Part II creates 
‘legislative precariousness’, or the particular vulnerability created by 
explicit exclusion or a lesser degree of protection in protective labor 
laws.134 Part IV highlights a number of areas in which domestic work 
legislation has been difficult to implement. This Part then addresses the 
challenges jurisdictions face when balancing the rights of domestic 
workers versus those of their employers to create a foundation for using 
a rights-based framework to analyze the balance of rights. 
Domestic work has been described as work ‘like no other’ that 
should be treated as any other.135 However, legislators often see 
domestic work as deserving of different treatment.136 This leads to 
legislative precariousness created either by explicit exclusions of 
domestic workers from legislation, or through lower standards of 
protection.137 The most precarious group of domestic workers are 
undocumented migrants who, due to their irregular immigration status, 
are less likely than workers with immigration documents to challenge 
abusive employment practices.138 
Exemptions from minimum wage and maximum working hour 
legislation render domestic workers without a grounds for complaint 
when employers increase working hours or withhold wages.139 Nearly 
half of the countries surveyed by the ILO exclude domestic workers 
from working time legislation, and eighty-three percent of these 
countries did not impose any limit on night time work.140 Even 
 
132. Id. art. 32(2)(c). 
133. Id. art. 36. 
134. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 133. 
135. Smith, supra note 4. 
136.  Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 133. 
137. See id. at 136; see also Ratifications of C182, supra note 10 (discussing disparate 
application of legislation to domestic workers). 
138. See THE RIGHT TO WORK, supra note 62, at 51. 
139. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra 84, at 55 (noting 
that complaint mechanisms help domestic workers enforce their rights). 
140. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 11. 
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developed economies, including the United Kingdom, United States, 
Canada, Finland, Japan, Greece, and Switzerland, exclude domestic 
workers from minimum wage legislation.141 Additional variables that 
cause the employment relationship to be precarious include labor 
market security, degree of legal protection, income, social factors such 
as gender or race, and relative control over employment contract terms 
such as duration and working conditions.142 Where standards exist, lack 
of government oversight causes legislative precariousness.143 
A. Challenges in Legislation 
Exclusion of domestic workers from legal protection under 
domestic law is widespread. This exclusion systematically limits DWs’ 
rights and labor protections and denies them effective access to 
justice.144 In 2013, the ILO estimated that 29.9 percent of all domestic 
workers are completely excluded from the scope of national labor 
legislation.145 Only ten percent have full coverage.146 Associations of 
domestic workers often lack the necessary political or social clout to 
effect change. This can be exacerbated by continued supply of domestic 
workers from poor, rural communities as rights-asserting workers are 
pushed out for ignorant ones.147 This Part highlights the particular 
challenges in regulating the domestic work industry: abolishing the 
practices that lead to forced labor, promoting occupational health and 
 
141. Mantouvalou, supra note 56, at 5. 
142. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 135. 
143. For example in the areas of labor inspections or health and safety regulations see 
supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, 
supra note 4, at 140. 
144. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 11; see also ILO, Giving Globalization a 
Human Face – General Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights at Work in 
Light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization, 101st Session, 2012. 
145. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 51. 
146. Id. 
147. BSAF, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that the preferred age of a domestic worker in 
Bangladesh is eight to fifteen years old because such a worker complains less, and is controlled 
and trained more easily than older workers). See also Bede Sheppard, Human Rights Watch, 
Workers in the Shadows: Abuse and Exploitation of Child Domestic Workers in Indonesia 39 
(Feb. 2009) (noting that the motivation of someone recruiting a child rather than an adult for 
domestic worker is that the former complains less, is easier to control, and has few social 
connections upon which to rely for help); Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 53 
(“employers hire children because they are ‘cheaper’ than their adult counterparts. They can be 
dismissed easily if labour demands fluctuate. They also form a docile, obedient workforce that 
is easier to exploit and will not seek to organize itself for protection and support.”). 
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safety, ensuring trade union participation, and ensuring access to 
justice. 
1. Forced Labor 
Forced labor occurs when an individual is coerced to work 
through menace of penalty.148 Forced labor can also incorporate more 
subtle means such as abuses of debt, retention of identity documents or 
threats by employers of denunciation to immigration authorities.149 
Forced labor in domestic work can occur due to poor labor standards, 
including lack of formal work contracts, undefined working hours, 
poor living accommodations and limits on social freedom during 
periods of rest.150 One remedy is to count work and on-call hours for 
the purposes of minimum wage and maximum working hour 
legislation.151 Article 10 of C189 requires that on-call working hours 
be regarded as hours of work, but only to the extent determined by 
national laws.152 R201 adopts more explicit protection, and suggests 
that members regulate the maximum number of hours in a given period 
that a DW may be required to be on standby.153 However, these actions 
require employers be willing and able to document working hours. 
 
148. ILO, Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), art. 2(1) (May 1, 1932). 
149. ILO, Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203), 
(June 11, 2014) (noting that forced labour can be addressed by preventing debt bondage, working 
with employers and immigration authorities). 
150. PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 18, (“Vulnerability to exploitation abroad is often 
heightened by routine violations committed in Nepal during the pre-departure phase by 
individual agents, recruitment agencies, and other private actors. These include misrepresenting 
the nature and terms of work available, overcharging on recruitment fees, delaying or cancelling 
departures, and failing to provide workers with correct pre-departure documents, including 
receipts and contracts of employment and recruitment. These abuses persist due to a lack of 
transparency, government oversight, and accountability in the private recruitment and placement 
of migrant workers—which also undermine workers’ ability to access justice for these harms.”); 
see also Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, supra note 15, at 155 (“Prevention measures could include 
actions to reduce the vulnerability of groups at particular risk of forced labour. In the case of 
migrant workers, these measures could include improving recruitment systems, monitoring 
recruitment agencies, strengthening the legislative framework and providing more training.”). 
151. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 61 (“These require, among other things, the 
adoption of strict limits to their working hours, prohibition of night work, and the need to 
establish mechanisms to monitor their working and living conditions.”). 
152. C189, supra note 23, art. 10. 
153. R201, supra note 107, art. 9(1)(a). 
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2. Occupational Safety and Health 
Domestic workers are vulnerable to particular occupational health 
and safety standards including limited rest, exposure to chemicals, 
physical pains due to heavy lifting, and increased risk of sexual and 
physical violence.154 Long working hours, repetitive motions, and 
monotonous or repetitive task can cause physical strain on workers’ 
bodies.155 Despite this, the ILO estimates that around ninety percent of 
domestic workers do not have social security coverage that would 
facilitate equal access to programs that would ensure an accident does 
not render them without protection, a fundamental human right.156 
Concerns with health and access to social security are addressed 
in Article 13 of C189 on the right to a safe and healthy working 
environment, with a caveat for progressive realization of this right.157 
However, conducting on-site workplace visits to employers’ homes for 
health and safety continues to be a problematic area in domestic 
work.158 Further, C189 suggests only that DWs negotiate with their 
employer whether or not to reside in the employer’s home.159 Requiring 
that domestic workers live with their employers has been affirmatively 
linked with abusive labor practices.160 However, many jurisdictions are 
 
154. ILO, Migrant Domestic Workers: Promoting Occupational Safety and Health, 1 
(2016) (“The ILO recognizes that domestic workers can be particularly vulnerable to certain 
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) risks including working long hours, limited rest, 
exposure to chemicals, lifting heavy weights, specific psychosocial risks and violence”). 
155. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 26; Ending Child Labour, 
supra note 12, at 33. 
156. ILO, Social Protection for Domestic Workers: Key policy trends and statistics, ix 
(“Due to the atypical characteristics of domestic work, workers are considered a “difficult-to-
cover” group by social security; it is estimated that globally 90 per cent of domestic workers are 
legally excluded from social security systems”). Access to social security is a fundamental 
human right, enumerated in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
157. C189, supra note 23, art. 13. 
158. See infra IV.B(1) on employer’s privacy. 
159. C189, supra note 23, art. 9; see infra IV.B(2) on employee’s privacy rights. 
160. Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11, at 22-23 (listing the 
international bodies that have expressed concern over Hong Kong’s live-in requirement, and 
noting: “MDWs are particularly vulnerable to excessive working hours given the nature of the 
work and “live-in” arrangements, where work and rest boundaries may be blurred”); see also 
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China 
with respect to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ¶ 20, Advance Unedited Version, 
Un Doc.: CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 (Dec. 2015) (noting that Hong Kong should allow workers 
to ‘live-out’ to prevent torture and ill-treatment). 
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resistant to even permit migrant domestic workers the option of ‘living-
out.’161 
C189 places an affirmative obligation on countries to develop and 
implement measures for labor inspection, including specifications 
under which access to household premises may be granted.162 R201 
further states that members should take steps to provide an adequate 
system of household inspection, and should consider implementing a 
system of household visits where labor inspectors are allowed to enter 
the premises.163 
3. Trade Union Participation 
Trade union representation and participation of domestic workers 
is notoriously difficult.164 It is particularly challenging to disseminate 
information to individuals working in private homes – particularly 
where domestic workers do not have days off from work.165 In some 
cases, domestic workers are legislatively excluded altogether from 
union activity, which can limit their interactions and informational 
exchange with similarly situated domestic workers.166 
Workers in any industry can be vulnerable to dismissal or other 
poor treatment for union participation, particularly migrants.167 R201 
encourages governments to consult “with the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers, and where they exist, with 
organizations representative of domestic workers and those 
representative of employers of domestic workers.”168 R201 thus 
 
161. For example, in Hong Kong there is some speculation that the government is 
concerned that loosened restrictions on migrant workers living conditions will allow them to 
claim abode, and thus obtain the right to vote. For a case challenging Hong Kong’s right to abode 
laws, see Vallejos Evangeline Banao v. Comm’r of Registration & Another, [2012] 2 H.K.C. 
185 (H.K.C.F.A.R.); For commentary on the same, See generally Two Pinoys in Hong Kong 
abode cases ordered to pay court costs, GMA NEWS NETWORK, July 16, 2013; see also HK High 
Court Overturns Immigration’s Decision On OFW, PHILIPPINE DAILY MIRROR, Oct 4, 2011. 
162. C189, supra note 23, art. 17. 
163. R201, supra note 107, art. 19(b). 
164. Fredman, supra note 94, at 410. 
165. Asha D’Souza, Int’l Labour Org., Moving Towards Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers: An Overview of the ILO’s Work, 23, 73, 81, (working Paper 2/2010 2010), supra note 
29. 
166. Mantouvalou, supra note 56, at 6; see also The Kafala, supra note 65, at 52 (noting 
that Oman and Qatar prohibit MDWs from joining trade unions). 
167. Id. at 50 (noting that migrant workers in Bahrain fear deportation if they join unions). 
168. R201, supra note 107, art. 13(2). 
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distinguishes between general unions and those representing domestic 
workers in particular. This distinction highlights a particular challenge: 
some general trade unions may have a conflict of interest between 
domestic workers and their members, who may employ domestic 
workers.169 Permitting workers to form their own unions must be 
accompanied by requirements that they be legislatively granted 
mandatory leave in order to have time to undertake union activities. 
This means that domestic workers must not be excluded from 
mandatory leave legislation. The formation of unions also relies on a 
democratic government that is receptive to union activity. 
4. Access to Justice 
Due to low levels of education or language skills among domestic 
workers and lack of knowledge about their rights, DWs often have 
difficulties accessing justice for labor and other violations committed 
against them. The previously enumerated difficulties in protecting 
domestic workers from forced labor, health hazards and dismissal also 
culminate to create difficulties in accessing justice.170 Article 15(b) of 
C189 calls for governments to ensure adequate procedures exist for 
investigating complaints and encourages bilateral, regional, or 
multilateral agreements to prevent abuses of MDWs and fraudulent 
practices.171 Solutions suggested by R201 include a national hotline 
with interpretation services and emergency housing.172 However, even 
the government employees of origin countries may not be well-trained 
or sympathetic to the particular needs of migrant domestic workers.173 
C189 suggests that origin countries inform migrant workers of their 
rights before departure, establish legal assistance funds, and supply 
social services and specialized consular services.174 
 
169. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 23. 
170. Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 155. (listing threat of deportation, 
limited mobility, and financial and communication barriers as hindrances to accessing legal 
justice); PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 145-55 (noting that MDWs do not access justice 
due to lack of awareness about rights, lack of evidence to support claims, fear of retaliation, 
perceptions of corruption, lack of regulation, and socio-political, economic or gender related 
obstacles). 
171. C189, supra note 23, art. 15(b). 
172. R201, supra note 107, art. 21(1)(a)-(c). 
173. Sarah Paoletti, Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Nepal, Open Soc. Foun. 
1, 152 (2014). 
174. R201, supra note 107, art. 21(2). 
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B. Favoring the Powerful: Balancing Rights 
Consideration must be given as to which rights are implicated in 
the oversight of the DW industry to draw a proper balance between the 
rights of employers and domestic workers. Human rights documents 
such as UNCRC, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights require that 
States grant equal human rights to individuals without 
discrimination.175 Respecting the privacy rights of employers while 
failing to respect those of domestic workers would constitute a breach 
this equal protection.176 It is an outdated idea that only certain types of 
people are deserving of rights. In the United States, a historical 
understanding of a man’s possessions extended to his family, his 
effects, and those who labored for him.177 This led care workers to be 
conflated with servants, who were part of an ‘estate’, and therefore 
confined to private life.178 The focus of legislators was primarily on the 
recipient of the care, rather than the giver, therefore “care as a labor of 
love . . . became a rationale to ignore the conditions of care as 
employment.”179 
The perception that domestic work should remain in the private 
domain persists today.180 Destination countries often tacitly (or even 
explicitly) refuse to acknowledge DWs as part of the formal labor 
force.181 In drafting exclusion statutes, states have occasionally used 
demeaning or outdated language, such as references to domestic 
workers as ‘menial or domestic servants’182 or as domestic ‘helpers’.183 
 
175. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1 
U.N.T.S. 4.  
176. Id. at 6. 
177. Boris, supra note 7, at 3. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 9. 
180. The Editors, Will Labor Reforms in the UAE Improve Life for Migrant Domestic 
Workers?, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
trend-lines/21968/will-labor-reforms-in-the-uae-improve-life-for-migrant-domestic-workers 
[https://perma.cc/BY4F-UM75]. 
181. Survey Results of 2016 Annual Earnings and Hours Survey release, GOVERNMENT 
OF HONG KONG CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/press_release/pressReleaseDetail.jsp?pressRID=4165&charsetID=
1 [https://perma.cc/AN5X-9PF6]. 
182. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 70. 
183. Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, H. K. Special Admin. Region, Oct. 2015, 
http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B71510FA2015XXXXB0100.pdf. 
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The United States’ exclusion of in-home care workers from the Fair 
Labor Standards Act left them un-eligible for old age insurance, 
unemployment, collective bargaining, minimum wage, maximum hour 
legislation, and other labor laws.184 
1. Employer’s Privacy 
Both C189 and R201 recognize the importance of employers’ 
privacy rights.185 At the same time, both documents require labor 
inspections to ensure occupational health and safety.186 The ILO’s 
Committee of Experts has observed that by choosing to make the 
household a workplace, employers have implicitly consented to giving 
up some privacy rights.187 Many countries have begun to adapt to the 
requirement of workplace inspections for domestic workers.188 
The private nature of the home means governments face more 
hurdles than in other industries to ensure that a DWs’ working 
conditions meet legal standards.189 Domestic workers have little 
political leverage to encourage government inspections.190 It is also 
next to impossible to observe a domestic worker at work in the same 
way one would observe a factory worker, as it would be quite easy for 
an employer to ensure that the domestic worker says the right things 
and behaves the right way during an inspection, even where that does 
not accurately reflect her lived experience. The fact that inspections of 
private homes must be announced adds another layer of possible 
obscurity as employers would have time to adjust any shortcomings in 
living or working conditions.191 
However, a functioning labor inspection system is required to 
ensure rule of law.192 The European Committee on Social Rights 
(“ECSR”) recognized the value of labor inspections in private homes, 
 
184. For discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the context of exclusion of domestic 
workers, see Boris, supra note 7, at 5. 
185. C189, supra note 23, art. 17(32) (noting that States shall specify the conditions under 
which access to the home can be granted, having due respect for privacy); R201, supra note 109, 
art. 24 (allowing labor inspectors considering respect for privacy). 
186. C189, supra note 23, art. 13. 
187. Kawar, supra note 74, at 8. See also ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 18. 
188. Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 18. 
189. Id. at 20-21. 
190. Id. at 18-19. 
191. Id. at 20, 32. 
192. Id. at 28. 
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reading Article 3, Section 2 of the European Social Charter as 
authorizing inspectors to check all workplaces, including residential 
premises.193 The Social Charter noted that labor inspections are 
particularly important to protect the health and safety rights of domestic 
and home care workers.194 Many EU countries recognized that the 
privacy interests of the employer do not necessarily outweigh domestic 
workers’ labor rights and authorize home visits.195 
An ILO Report from 2010 suggests that inspectors can obtain 
prior authorization from a judicial authority or through the consent of 
the employer.196 Alternatively in Uruguay, workers from the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security are able to visit the domestic worker and 
interview her at the front door of the home, thereby alleviating any 
concerns about unannounced visits into the home.197 Meanwhile, Some 
labor unions are taking on the role of conducting home visits. In Kenya, 
the Union of Domestic, Hotels, Educational Institutions, Hospitals and 
Allied Workers has conducted thousands of such visits in five cities.198 
2. Domestic Worker’s Rights 
Some associations of employers of domestic workers did not 
support the development of a convention for standard setting for 
domestic workers,199 and in some jurisdictions employers remain 
hostile to improved legal protection for domestic workers.200 
 
193. Eur Soc. Charter, Conclusions XCI-2, Czech Republic, art. 3 (“[F]or the purposes of 
Article 3 § 2, inspectors must be authorized to check all workplaces. It takes workplaces to 
equally include residential premises.”). 
194. Id. 
195. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 17, 32 
(noting that in many EU countries, most labor inspectorates cover the domestic work sector). 
196. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 249. 
197. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 14. 
198. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 19. 
199. Kawar, supra note 74, at, 496 (“employer delegates remained adamantly opposed to 
any additional exercises in standard-setting”). For opposition in the United States, see Boris & 
Klein, CARING FOR AMERICA, supra note 44, at 132 (stating that well-organized trade 
associations and business interest groups had long opposed minimum wage and New Deal 
programs). 
200. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 18 (noting that 48% of employers in India, Thailand, Italy 
and Sweden do not think that a domestic worker is entitled to a contract, 70% said they should 
not have the right to join a trade union, 52% were opposed to a minimum wage and 45% said 
that fixed working hours should not apply); In Hong Kong, ‘employer’s groups’ have petitioned 
the government to give them greater control over the migrant domestic worker’s rights, 
including withholding of passports, see Tom Grundy & Meredith McBride, Top 10 Most 
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Destination countries of domestic migrant labor have little incentive to 
improve protections for workers who hold little social or political clout 
– particularly where supply of domestic work is greater than 
demand.201 Further, some employers act as though food and 
accommodation are benefits, when in reality “living-in” is a price being 
paid by domestic workers in terms of isolation and lack of 
companionship.202 Where DWs reside with their employers, their 
ability to leave the premises, host guests, or enjoy leisure time may be 
severely limited.203 C189 requires that DWs be given at least twenty-
four hours of leave per week.204 There are concerns that standard 
setting in domestic work would require elderly employers who require 
around the clock care to comply with the same labor standards as 
corporations, though this concern appears inflated.205 
On living conditions, C189 requires only decent living conditions 
that respect privacy.206 Neither C189 nor R201 define privacy. While 
some countries fail to define adequate privacy in domestic legislation, 
South Africa does regulate basic privacy for live-in domestic workers. 
There, DWs can agree to live-in in exchange for a fee of no more than 
ten percent of their wages.207 DWs are legislatively required to be given 
a separate room with one window and a door that locks.208 This is a 
vast improvement over the reality of many domestic workers.209 
DWs are sometimes exempt from protective legislation even 
where labor laws may protect their employers. The need to present 
labor rights as human rights comes not just from a desire for greater 
dignity, but also “from the perceived need to respond to employers’ 
 
Outrageous Claims, Myths & Demands Heard at Last Week’s Gov’t Meeting, HONG KONG 
HELPERS CAMPAIGN (Mar. 4, 2014); see also Stanley Leung, ‘Heartbroken’: Domestic worker 
employer group decries window cleaning ban, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Oct. 20, 2016). 
201. PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 26. 
202. R201, supra note 107, art. 14. See Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 77. 
203. For more on examples of restrictions placed on domestic workers by their employers, 
see Grundy supra note 34. 
204. C189, supra note 23, art. 10(2). 
205. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 77 (highlighting comments from a Ms. 
Warwick in the International Labour Conference Record of Proceedings on June 5, 2011). 
206. C189, supra note 23, art. VI. 
207. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 §8(a)-(b) (S. Afr.); see also 
LABOUR DEP’T OF S. AFRICA, Domestic Workers What You Should Know, at 13 (2012). 
208. In addition, the room must be weatherproof and in good condition, and have access 
to a bathroom. What You Should Know, supra note 207, at 13. 
209. Gabby Bess, Hong Kong Domestic Workers are Forced to Sleep in Cabinets: Report, 
VICE (May 24, 2017). 
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willingness to use these arguments and tools themselves.”210 Because 
human rights apply to individuals without discrimination, both 
employers and domestic workers should enjoy the right to privacy in 
their living space. It is not in keeping with equality to grant the right of 
privacy to the employer, while failing to ensure that a live-in domestic 
worker has adequate privacy through labor inspections.211 It is ironic 
that some DWs, with few legal protections and low wages, facilitate 
the ability of their employers to enter the labor force, where the 
employers may already have adequate legal protections. Yet, some 
employers would deny DWs these same rights. 
V. CONNECTING DOMESTIC WORK AND CHILD LABOR 
This Part first considers the differences between child and adult 
DWs, particularly in regard to their legal ability to consent to 
potentially hazardous work. Despite these difference, adult and child 
DWs exhibit similar indicators of labor trafficking.212 This suggests 
that the nature of the industry creates opportunities for abuse. A 2006 
joint ILO and International Programme on the Elimination of Child 
Labour (“IPEC”) report on trade unions and child labor indicates that 
child labor could be eradicated by improving labor conditions and 
economic opportunities for adults, who often send their own children 
to work due to the cycle of poverty.213 This Note posits that the opposite 
is true as well: improving working conditions for children engaged in 
domestic work would not only empower them when they become 
adults in the industry, but would also improve working conditions for 
adult domestic workers. Workers and advocates could thus prevent a 
 
210. Virginia Mantouvalou, Are Labour Rights Human Rights?, citing C. Fenwick and T. 
Novitz, Conclusion: Regulating to Protect Workers’ Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT 
WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 587-88 (C. Fenwick and T. Novitz eds. 
2010). 
211. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 160. 
212. ILO, Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings. Results from Delphi 
Survey Implemented by the ILO and the European Commission (2009) [hereinafter Delphi 
indicators]. 
213. Markie M., Production, Reproduction, and Feminism, J. MEDIA, 2017, 
https://journal.media/production-reproduction-and-feminism [https://perma.cc/WA6H-5HCM]. 
See also Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 59 (“Bringing about improved working 
conditions for adults should result in a corresponding decline in the incidence of child labour 
and growth in the number of children enrolling and remaining in school.”). 
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‘race-to-the-bottom’ where employers favor younger, less expensive 
(and less assertive) workers.214 
Though the public and media are generally responsive to, and 
often outraged by215 reports of child labor and abuse, including in the 
area of domestic work, the outcry has not always been the same for 
adult DWs. Of those domestic worker abuse stories that have received 
international public attention in English media, many are young and 
female.216 The ILO estimates that 17.2 million children worldwide are 
engaged in paid or unpaid domestic work in the home of another 
person.217 Of these 17.2 million children, 11.5 million are female.218 
Further, domestic work can often be a precursor to sexual 
exploitation.219 
While governments are willing to take steps to protect children 
from abusive labor, it is not clear they are equally interested in 
 
214. Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that the preferred age of a domestic 
worker in Bangladesh is eight to fifteen years old and, further, that such a worker who complains 
less, is controlled and trained more easily than an older worker); see also Sheppard, Workers in 
the Shadows, supra note 147, at 39 (noting that the motivation of someone recruiting a child 
rather than an adult for domestic work is that the former complains less, is easier to control, and 
has few social connections upon which to rely for help). 
215. See John H. Cushman Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. Rules 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/
international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-child-labor-and-apply-us-rules-abroad.html 
[https://perma.cc/8BAW-FUJB]; see also Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect; 
Looking Behind Those Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/business/a-sweetheart-becomes-suspect-looking-behind-
those-kathie-lee-labels.html [https://perma.cc/35D4-Y63U]; Tim Worstall, The Outrage Of 
Child Labor In Bangladesh’s Sweatshops, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2016/12/19/the-outrage-of-child-labour-in-bangladeshs-sweatshops/ 
[https://perma.cc/U82S-8TPF]. 
216. See generally Michael Forsythe, Hong Kong Worker Wins Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/asia/hong-kong-court-convicts-
employer-in-abuse-of-domestic-worker.html [https://perma.cc/AD6P-D3P4]; Couple Jailed for 
Starving Maid: Previous Maid Abuse Cases in Singapore, STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 28, 2017, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/couple-jailed-for-starving-maid-
previous-maid-abuse-cases-in-singapore [https://perma.cc/7KY9-63NC]; Annie Kelly & Hazel 
Thompson, The vanished: the Filipino domestic workers who disappear behind closed doors, 
THE GUARDIAN, Oct 24, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/oct/24/
the-vanished-filipino-domestic-workers-working-abroad  [https://perma.cc/A5WQ-K9AA]. 
217. ILo, Child Domestic Work: Global Estimates 2012, 2 (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_23235/lang--en/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GC4W-UDAG]. 
218. Id. 
219. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 36. 
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protecting adult domestic workers.220 The age of majority in most 
countries is eighteen, though many countries permit domestic labor to 
be undertaken by individuals over the age of fifteen or sixteen.221 In 
many jurisdictions, eighteen is the age at which individuals are held 
responsible for their decisions to undertake work or migrate for labor, 
and therefore are accepting the risks inherent in that role.222 
While recognizing that line-drawing legislation around age is 
necessary given children’s unique protections under ILO and UN 
mechanisms, to give effect to these international agreements requires 
countries to affirmatively adopt protections and mechanisms to aid 
CDWs to leave abusive situations.223 These international conventions 
do not ban all forms of child labor.224 Rather, they focus on the most 
exploitative types.225 It follows then that these conventions and their 
signatories find appalling not simply that children work, but that they 
are subject to coercive and abusive forms of labor. Age is just one of 
many factors that would be considered in determining whether a 
worker is in a coercive form of labor.226 The age of a DW is not the 
ultimate factor for determining whether abuse has occurred. Rather, 
states look at whether specific coercive factors have deprived a DW of 
a means of changing their situation.227 These coercive factors include 
the worker’s dependency on the employer, social isolation, lack of 
alternative living or working arrangements, abusive working hours, 
high risk of abuse, and lack of support mechanisms such as social 
security or legal aid.228 A compilation of these factors ultimately 
 
220. See supra Part III.A. 
221. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19. 
222. R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2) (noting that special attention should be given to 
domestic workers under the age of 18); see also Determining the Legal Age to Consent to 
Research, University of Washington St. Louis, https://hrpo.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
01/5-Determining-Legal-Age-to-Consent.pdf. 
223. See supra Part III.B. 
224. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 14-24. 
225. Id. at 14-25. 
226. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212; see also infra Part IV.B. 
227. The eight Delphi Indicators of trafficking of children for labour exploitation are the 
same eight factors for trafficking of adults for labour exploitation, with the exception that ‘no 
access to education’ is given less weight for adults than it is for children. Similarly, adult and 
child workers share the same seven indicators of abuse of vulnerability at destination, with the 
exception that two are considered ‘weak indicators’ for adults and ‘medium indicators’ for 
children. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212. 
228. See infra Part V.B. 
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deprives a DW of the ability to choose to leave an abusive situation, 
rendering them in a form of exploitative labor. 
Ascertaining the age of workers can be difficult. Many of the rural 
communities in developing economies from which domestic workers 
come do not provide ID documents at birth, making it difficult to 
confirm an individual’s age.229 Some employment agencies will lie 
about a worker’s age to secure her placement abroad.230 Anti-Slavery 
International noted a ‘step-migration’ where children in Peru and the 
Philippines work outside major cities, closer to their rural homes, and 
then migrate towards larger urban areas as they became older. 
Therefore never require this paperwork until they go abroad.231 
Some NGOs have begun to use the overlap between exploitative 
child labor and domestic work in their rights advocacy. In February 
2013, Human Rights Watch called on governments to ratify C189 to 
end child labor.232 UNICEF, in 2013, used its World Day against Child 
Labor to call for the ratification of C189.233 The ILO also called for 
ratification of C189 to help end child labor234 noting that child labor in 
domestic work abuses children’s rights and remains a serious hurdle in 
ensuring decent work for adults.235 The ILO with the International 
Domestic Workers Federation published a 2017 Best Practice Report 
advocating approaches to reduce the worst forms of child labor in 
domestic work in India and Nepal.236 The ILO-IPEC report also notes 
 
229. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 47; Voices of Child Domestic 
Workers, supra note 27, at 8. 
230. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 47; see also Jalelah Abu Baker, 
When a Maid Lies about Her Age, ASIA ONE, (June 3, 2014), http://www.asiaone.com/
singapore/when-maid-lies-about-her-age [https://perma.cc/L2LH-LF2C]; Syliva Yu, The 
Indonesian Child Maids of Hong Kong, Singapore: Why they’re Suffering in Silence, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/20818
23/indonesian-child-maids-hong-kong-singapore-why-theyre-suffering [https://perma.cc/2JER-
3NJJ]. 
231. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 33. 
232. Human Rights Watch, Protect 15 Million Child Domestic Workers HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/25/protect-15-million-child-
domestic-workers [https://perma.cc/99UX-F75D]. 
233. U.N.I.C.E.F., World Day Against Child Labour: Plight of child domestic workers, 
YOUTUBE (Jun. 12, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbkAoppuUwc (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K2GF-JZLA]. 
234. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 53. 
235. Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS BUREAU, PROMOTE: 
DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS TO END CHILD DOMESTIC WORK (2012). 
236. ILO, INT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS FED’N., DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS: 
EIGHT GOOD PRACTICES FROM ASIA(2017).  
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that adult unions have played a role as a public watchdog, monitoring 
and intervening in extreme cases of child labor abuse, and that civil 
society plays a crucial role in training and providing social services to 
victims of abusive labor practices.237 
A. Differences between Adult and Child DWs 
Before highlighting the similar vulnerabilities between the two 
groups, it is important to address the primary differences between adult 
DWs and CDWs. First, one of the primary concerns with child labor is 
that work will interfere in children’s ability to obtain an education – a 
fundamental right of a child, and one that is not given equivalent 
importance for adult workers.238 Secondly, adult domestic workers are 
legally able to give consent to undertake work that may be considered 
hazardous, whereas children cannot. Finally, the employers of these 
workers may be different as many children are employed by extended 
family members, whereas adults may work for non-family 
domestically or abroad. 
The noted similarities between adult and child DWs is not meant 
to conflate the two groups or in any way undermine the sophistication 
or autonomy of adult domestic workers. Domestic workers are 
increasingly sophisticated and organized.239 Some child DWs have 
argued for greater respect for their decisions and autonomy.240 Rather, 
this approach addresses the systemic shortcomings in industry 
regulation. It is not clear that adult domestic workers, particularly 
migrants, automatically consent to any working conditions simply by 
virtue of their adulthood. This is particularly true when they face 
unexpected and illegal abuse. 
The relevant inquiry regarding abuse of DWs is thus not the age 
of the domestic worker or their choice to work, but rather the 
deprivation of autonomy.241 The inability to decide when to leave a 
work situation can occur where domestic workers of any age migrate 
 
237. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 46. 
238. UNCRC, supra note 10, § 28. 
239. See Mather supra note 118, at 3-9.240. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra 
note 27, at 3. 
240. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 3. 
241. Jonathan Blagbrough, Child Domestic Labour: A Modern Form of Slavery, 22 
CHILD. & SOC’Y 179, 185 (Apr. 7, 2008) (“[I]t is not merely about the age of the child being too 
young to work, or to choose to work; it is about being deprived of the opportunity to choose.”). 
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for work. Migration, even internal, can enhance dependency on 
employers. Dependency due to migration status can lead to an 
employers’ failure to adhere to contract terms such as fair pay and 
working hours, where they exist, which may render the workers in a 
form of forced labor.242 
1. Education 
Many children in domestic labor have had limited opportunities 
to obtain an education. In some cases, children migrate from rural areas 
to urban ones to obtain an education, earning in-kind benefits by 
working in someone else’s home.243 C189 requires that domestic 
workers under eighteen not be deprived of compulsory education or 
other opportunities to participate in education or vocational training.244 
C182 also highlights the importance of education for children.245 In 
practice, educational opportunities may not cater to the realities of 
working children. Children who migrate for work in particular, are at 
high risk of exploitation, and prone to long working hours.246 Long 
working hours may prevent children from accessing their right to 
education, or render them too exhausted to study.247 The importance 
given to the right of a child to obtain an education distinguishes CDWs 
from their adult counterparts. 
Though the lack of access to education is not as acute as for 
children, adult DWs, particularly those that live with employers, may 
be required to forego opportunities for additional education or skills 
 
242. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 364 (“[D]rew specific attention to 
increased vulnerability and lack of protection of migrant workers’ rights due to the high 
dependency of the worker on the employer, live in requirements and employer-tied visas, 
including in temporary and seasonal migration programmes.”). This is particularly true in 
Middle East jurisdictions that utilize a Kafala system of sponsorship, which requires employer 
approval before leaving a job, preventing migrant workers from leaving abusive employment 
situations. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Alternatively, in Hong Kong, a local NGO 
found that migrant workers on their first contract were 2.7 times more likely to experience 
conditions of forced labor than experienced workers. Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, supra note 
11, at 7. 
243. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27 at 16-17; see also Ending Child 
Labour, supra note 12, at 37. 
244. C189, supra note 23, art. 4(2). 
245. C182, supra note 114, art. 3. 
246. ILO, MIGRATION AND CHILD LABOUR, http://ilo.org/ipec/areas/Migration_
and_CL/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
247. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 37-38. 
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training.248 While C189 provides an entitlement to vocational training 
or education specifically for children, R201 emphasizes continuing 
education for adults.249 Preventing workers from accessing education 
denies them the ability to develop the necessary skills to move out of 
domestic work, if they so choose.250 
2. Consent 
Perhaps the most salient difference between CDWs and adult 
DWs is the notion that the latter, as adults, are assumed to understand 
and consent to the risks inherent in undertaking domestic work. Adult 
DWs are presumed to accept certain risks, such as the use of hazardous 
household chemicals or the use of potentially dangerous household 
appliances and tools such as knives, irons or propane gas tanks.251 
Adult domestic workers are more equipped to handle these types of 
potential household dangers than children. Adult DWs are also able to 
migrate for work, and can therefore consent to debt-financed migration, 
whereas children typically cannot.252 
3. Employers 
A final difference between adult DWs and CDWs is that the 
former are more likely to work for strangers. In some cultures, the 
employer of a CDW is seen as ‘fostering’ or ‘adopting’ the child in 
order to facilitate the child’s access to education or provide food and 
accommodation that the child’s family cannot.253 The relationship 
between the ‘substitute parent’ and the CDW can blur the lines of the 
employment relationship, and may impact their ability to obtain a 
 
248. This is in contravention of their Article 4 rights in C189. C189, supra note 23, art. 
4(2). 
249. Id. See R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2)(a) (“strictly limiting their hours of work to 
ensure adequate time for rest, education and training, leisure activities and family contacts”). 
250. Resolution Concerning Decent Work, supra note 17, ¶ 19. 
251. For a list of dangerous tasks that children are asked to undertake in domestic work 
see Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 63. 
252. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that a common dimension of migrant workers 
is debt-financed migration). 
253. In many cultures, having a young female in the home to do chores is culturally 
acceptable. Anti-Slavery International supra note 99, at 4. See  Swept Under the Rug, supra note 
117, at 54 (noting that children often find employment with parental help). 
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formal employment contract.254 These relationships can also mask 
exploitation and abuse.255 
4. Limitations of this Approach 
There are limitations in utilizing a rights-based framework to 
advocate for industry-wide regulation. This approach assumes that 
countries have a genuine interest in eradicating child labor within their 
borders. Though the UNCRC has near universal ratification, not all 
countries are actively working to achieve its mandate. This may be 
particularly true of small, wealthy labor destination countries.256 Some 
jurisdictions believe that child labor is almost completely eradicated 
within their borders and may have little incentive to patrol the domestic 
work industry for indicators of it.257 Finally, many communities may 
believe that children do not have independent rights of their own and 
therefore may be socially resistant to a rights-based framework.258 
B. Similar Risk Factors: Adult and Child DWs 
Adult DWs and CDWs share many similarities aside from their 
job title and demographics which make them ripe for comparison under 
protective legal frameworks. These commonalities include dependency 
on their employer, power inequality, social isolation, risk of low or no 
pay, risk of abusive working hours, and finally the risk of emotional, 
physical and sexual abuse.259 These commonalities are not exhaustive, 
 
254. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 27. 
255. Id. at 28. 
256. In 2016 Hong Kong was downgraded to a Tier-2 Watch List on the U.S. State 
Department Trafficking in Persons Report. Despite labor trafficking being well-documented in 
the territory, including children trafficked for sexual and domestic labor, the Hong Kong 
government has expressed little interest in regulating it. Karen Cheung, Hong Kong 
Downgraded to Join Ranks of Uzbekistan, Niger, Afghanistan in Annual Trafficking Report, H. 
K. FREE PRESS, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/01/hong-kong-downgraded-to-join-
ranks-of-uzbekistan-niger-afghanistan-in-annual-trafficking-report/ [https://perma.cc/GX5N-
BGYT].  
257. Singapore has noted that child labour is not a ‘significant’ issue, even though some 
children are reported to be working in sex work in the territory. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2016 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – SINGAPORE, §7(c); see also DemandAT, supra 
note 5, at 12 (noting that “child trafficking in DW has received little attention within the 
European context, and there is no available data regarding the scope, even if limited, of the 
issue”). 
258. Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 54. 
259. See supra Part II.B. 
2018] PROTECTIONS FOR PRECARIOUS AND CDWS 1375 
but commonly appear in abusive domestic labor situations, and are 
indicators of labor exploitation.260 Abuses of these vulnerabilities and 
exploitative conditions of work have been positively linked with 
trafficking.261 Push factors, including poverty, that cause individuals to 
seek domestic work remain similar for different age groups.262 
1. Dependency on Employer & Power Inequality 
Domestic workers are often dependent on their employer for 
housing, food, and wages, thereby creating a significant power 
inequality.263 This power imbalance may prevent them from feeling 
able to enforce their rights and leave them vulnerable to exploitation.264 
In many communities, this power inequality is exacerbated by many of 
the discrimination factors already noted: age, gender, class, race, and 
migration status.265 These vulnerabilities, and cultural acceptance of 
inequality, can make workers more likely to put up with abusive 
conditions, particularly where they and their families are dependent on 
remittances.266 
Where DWs live with their employers, they are dependent on their 
employer to provide adequate living facilities, health, food, and other 
daily necessities.267 CDWs may be dependent on the living 
arrangement provided by an employer living in an urban area so that 
they continue to access education that is not available in their home 
towns.268 Similarly, MDWs may be reliant on employers for their visa 
if their immigration status is linked with employment.269 To speak up 
 
260. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212. 
261. Id. 
262. For push factors for adult migrant workers, see Trafficking in the Middle East, supra 
note 15, at 45-6. For push factors for children, see Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra 
note 27, at 40; see also ILO-IPEC Interregional Workshop, supra note 57, at 38. 
263. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 9. 
264. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 364. 
265. See Smith, supra note 4. 
266. Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 104 (“knowing that they will accept 
these terms because they are under pressure from their families to remit badly needed money 
home”); for more on remittances, see Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 
11, at 50. 
267. Id. at 64 (“these range from the hours that MDWs work, to where they sleep and at 
what times, what food they may eat, what to wear and many other aspects that blur the 
boundaries of work/home life.”). 
268. See supra Part V.A. 
269. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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about poor working conditions is to risk losing gainful employment and 
the living arrangements upon which they rely. This dependency can 
create or exacerbate other factors: social isolation and poor living 
conditions, risk of low wages, abusive working hours, and emotional, 
physical or sexual abuse. 
2. Social Isolation and Poor Living Conditions 
Many DWs migrate long distances from a rural to urban 
households.270 Migration status, even when moving within one’s own 
country, can cause vulnerabilities because migrants may lack 
knowledge about local languages, resources, or laws.271 Individuals 
who live with an employer are more isolated, and therefore have 
limited access to social services or resources that could help them in an 
abusive situation.272 Employers often use threats of denunciation or 
reporting to authorities as common tactics to control DWs.273 Poor 
family ties, poor working conditions, lack of social support, and poor 
self-reported health have been affirmatively linked with poor 
psychosocial outcomes in child DWs.274 Beyond simply emotional 
isolation and lack of support networks, both adults and children may 
struggle to understand occupational health and safety related 
information such as labels on cleaning products that may be in another 
language, heightening the risk of accidents and injuries.275 
Anti-Slavery International recommends reducing isolation and 
limiting social discrimination against domestic workers.276 Support 
 
270. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 30. 
271. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 44. 
272. See id.; see also Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 
84, at 7, (“In some countries migrant domestic workers require their employers’ permission in 
order to leave the household thereby restricting their potential to contact protection 
mechanisms.”). 
273. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212; see also Case of C.N. v. The United Kingdom, 
App. No. 4239/08 (2013) (C.N.’s trafficker “constantly warned her that she should not talk to 
people and that she could easily be arrested or otherwise come to harm.”). 
274. Jennie Gamlin et al., Is Domestic Work [the] Worst Form of Child Labour? The 
Findings of a Six-Country Study of the Psychosocial Effects of Child Work, Vol. 13/2 Children’s 
Geographies 212, 222 (2015) (the study did not find migration itself to be a risk factor for poor 
psychosocial outcomes in children, but it did note that children living at home indicated better 
outcomes than those living with employers). 
275. Occupational health and safety risks for the most vulnerable workers, EUR. PARL., 84 
(Aug. 2011) (“This suggests that, for migrant workers, learning the language and getting 
acquainted with the culture of the host society diminishes the risk of occupational incidents.”). 
276. Blagbrough, supra note 241, at 187. 
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groups such as unions are crucial for empowering DWs to advocate 
collectively for improved working conditions. Critically, domestic 
workers must have time off from work and away from employers to be 
able to access such groups.277 
3. Risk of No or Little Pay 
Because they often operate within the informal economy, DWs 
are at risk of being paid inadequate wages below the minimum required 
level or non-payment of wages.278 The boundaries between free time, 
work time, and on-call time become blurred.279 DWs also risk being 
subject to deprivations of liberty and freedom of movement, such as 
limitations on when they are able to take free time or excessive or 
exploitative working hours.280 The lack of a formal contract 
exacerbates these risks as domestic workers may have difficulty 
proving the existence of an employment relationship and may therefore 
be unable to force payment through the justice system.281 Though lack 
of a contract is less likely to be an issue for migrant domestic 
workers282, they may face similar barriers in accessing the legal system, 
may fall victim to fraud, or may be denied a copy of the contract.283 
Intermediaries play a crucial role in recruiting and placing 
domestic workers in a home.284 The intermediary could be a family 
member or a formal agency or recruiter who will receive a fee or 
percentage of a DW’s salary for recruiting the individual into domestic 
work.285 These individuals and agents can, and often do, misrepresent 
 
277. C189 requires a day of rest, though not all countries require this. C189, supra note 
23, art. 10.  
278. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 40, 
(noting that “domestic workers in many countries find it difficult to negotiate wages above the 
legal minimum, even where a minimum wage for domestic workers exists”). 
279. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 9. 
280. See Human Rights Watch, “I Was Sold”:  Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Oman, (June 13, 2016); see also Occupational Health and Safety Risk for 
the Most Vulnerable Workers, at 87-88. 
281. See ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 123. 
282. This is because, by virtue of being international migrants, they will likely have one 
as justification for a working visa. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶ 129. 
283. See ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶¶ 131, 253. 
284. See ENRICH HONG KONG ‘EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES UNCOVERED’ http://www.
enrichhk.org/2016/06/partner-blog-employment-agency-fees-uncovered/ (last visited Mar. 21, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/C2ZD-X9SD]. 
285. Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 197. 
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crucial components of working conditions such as wage, education 
opportunities, and living conditions such as privacy.286 Occasionally, 
agencies or employers will confiscate passports and other crucial 
identity documents, a medium indicator of forced labor.287 
4. Abusive Working Hours 
Domestic workers who live with their employers are exposed to 
the risk of abusive working hours. Ninety-one percent of CDWs in 
India and seventy-two percent of those in Togo reported that they had 
no days off in a week.288 It was also common for these workers to report 
that they worked all day without breaks.289 Research by Anti-Slavery 
International indicates that some CDWs in Lima reported that 
employers sometimes tried to isolate them from their families, and in 
Tanzania one-third of CDWs reported that they were not able to host 
visitors.290 
Forced labor occurs when coercion is imposed on a domestic 
worker to prevent them from leaving an employment situation.291 This 
can result from a variety of factors, including financial and familial 
pressure to retain employment and send remittances.292 Excessive 
working hours is a strong indicator of exploitation that can impact 
physical and psychosocial well-being.293 Disturbingly, the 
vulnerabilities of CDWs and MDWs in particular can be desirable to 
employers because the workers are willing to accept low salaries and 
are more likely to consent to the employer’s demands.294 
 
286. Underpayment 2: The Continuing Systematic Extortion of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers in Hong Kong: An In-Depth Study, 30 (Sep. 2007); see also “I Was Sold,” supra note 
280. 
287. For an example of passport confiscation, see “I Was Sold,” supra note 280, at 1. For 
confiscation of passports and crucial identity documents, see Delphi Indicators, supra note 212 
(noting that confiscation of documents is a medium risk factor for both children and adults). 
288. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 218. 
289. Id. 
290. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 15. 
291. See D’Souza, supra note 29, at 28-32; see also Swept Under the Rug, supra note 117, 
at 23. 
292. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 104; see generally Anderson & 
Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11. 
293. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 222. For forced labor as an indicator of exploitation, 
see Delphi Indicators, supra note 212. 
294. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 11. See also Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, 
at 11. 
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5. Emotional, Physical and Sexual Abuse 
A system that places disproportionate power in the hands of 
employers and isolates workers can, in the worst cases, lead to abuse 
and torture.295 Qualitative studies indicate that young domestic workers 
face heightened risk of physical, psychosocial, emotional and sexual 
abuse.296 In a survey of child domestic workers in six countries, many 
stated that their employers used physical punishment.297 Physical 
violence consisted of beating, pinching, kicking, whipping, scalding 
with hot water, overworking, and denying food.298 The same survey 
found that CDWs often showed signs of emotional stress when 
compared with a control group, including drops in their sense of 
personal pride and their perceived ability to rely on adults or friends.299 
Lack of support networks can also leave DWs prone to emotional 
abuse, particularly where employers use ethnicity- or race-based 
insults.300 Though adult domestic workers may be able to assume risks 
such as social isolation or long working hours, they cannot 
unknowingly assume the risk of illegal physical, emotional or sexual 
abuse at the hands of their employers. Further, anecdotal evidence 
shows that cultural and social acceptance of violence as an 
occupational hazard may render DWs less likely to report it, even 
where they are familiar with the avenues for doing so.301 
 
295. See Ayaz Akbar Yousufzai, Judge Probed Over Alleged Torture of 10-year-old Maid, 
GEO.TV (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.geo.tv/latest/125508-Local-courts-judge-probed-for-
violence-on-10-year-old-domestic-worker [https://perma.cc/5VDA-J9EM]; see also Diana 
Alghoul, Hundreds of ‘Tortured’ Bangladeshi Women Flee Saudi Arabia, THE NEW ARAB (May 
2, 2017), https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2017/5/2/Hundreds-of-tortured-Banglad
eshi-women-flee-Saudi-Arabia.  
296. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 213. See also Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 59 
(noting that female child domestic workers in Bangladesh suffered a much higher rate of 
inappropriate touching (19.6%) than male children (3.3%)). 
297. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 218. 
298. Blagbrough, supra note 241, at 186. 
299. Id. at 219 (noting, however, that this wasn’t universally true – Peruvian, Philippine 
and Tanzanian child domestic workers showed high levels of psychosocial satisfaction).  
300. See D’Souza, supra note 29, at 24; see also Decent Work for Domestic Workers at ¶ 
231 (noting that temporary accommodation and a support network are crucial to help domestic 
workers escape abuse). 
301. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 25 (noting that “Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that 
most incidents of verbal and physical abuse are not treated as violence which necessitates action, 
but only as an occupational hazard”). 
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Discrimination based on age, religion, gender, class, and national 
origin can contribute to societal attitudes toward domestic workers. 
These biases affect the value of the work done and the treatment of 
DWs.302 “Humiliation”, “treated worse than dogs”303 and “they respect 
their animals more” 304 have been used to describe the emotional abuse 
domestic workers of different age groups have faced in their work. 
VI. USING SIMILARITIES TO ENHANCE RIGHTS PROTECTION 
The similarities above indicate that there are systemic problems 
in the domestic work industry. However, governments, including 
developed economies, still often fail to appropriately monitor the 
industry, prevent abuse, and even punish those responsible for the 
worst forms of domestic labor.305 Evidence shows that workers can 
become victims of the above abuses, regardless of their age. 306 
Industry wide protection should therefore be adopted that would 
respect the rights of both children and adults engaging in domestic 
work. These protections should target the elimination of illegal and 
exploitative domestic work. 
Basic labor protections must be implemented by governments to 
eradicate the worst forms of child labor in domestic work.307 Unions 
and NGOs, though playing a pivotal role, should not be solely 
responsible for the eradication of these labor abuses. Advocates can use 
the connection between CDWs and DWs to encourage governments to 
comply with industry-wide basic labor standards they have already 
agreed to abide by under the international frameworks.308 
This Note divides relevant labor rights from ILO Conventions 189 
and 182 into two categories. The first are basic rights, which this Note 
 
302. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 19 (CDWs stated that the 
most difficult part of their burden is discrimination and isolation); see also Tomei, supra note 
24, at 186 (arguing that classifying domestic work as ‘women’s work’ devalues the work); 
Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11, at 46 (migrant domestic workers 
are undervalued and receive less than half of Hong Kong’s minimum wage). 
303. Zigor Aldama, Hong Kong’s Domestic Workers ‘Treated Worse Than the Dogs’, 
DW.COM (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/hong-kongs-domestic-workers-treated-worse-
than-the-dogs/a-18302005 [https://perma.cc/N48Q-WL3S]. 
304. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27. 
305. For an analysis of the U.K’s failure to recognize, investigate, and prosecute a form of 
child labor, see generally Case of C.N., supra note 273. 
306. Smith, supra note 4, at 171. 
307. See supra Part III.B. 
308. Id.309. C182, supra note 114, preamble. 
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argues have equal application to both children and adult DWs. These 
rights are not intended to be exhaustive, but have been chosen as the 
most pressing rights affecting both groups. These rights include the 
right to be free from forced labor, the right to occupational health, the 
right to social security, the right to remuneration, trade union rights and 
the freedom of association, the right to gender equality and non-
discrimination, and equal treatment under the law. In the second 
category, this Note places rights that are not generally applicable to or 
appropriate in regard to child labor, including the rights to abode and 
resident, and maternity rights. It is unlikely that domestic workers can 
demand these rights in conjunction with the eradication of child labor. 
By dividing rights into basic rights and rights that are not 
applicable, this Note highlights which rights violations can be 
affirmatively linked to child labor abuses. Achieving C182’s goal of 
eradicating the most abusive forms of child labor309 would have 
industry-wide impacts that would also prevent adult DWs from falling 
into conditions of labor exploitation. 
Here, there are two points of note. First, it is crucial that any 
government regulation not be so stringent as to push the industry 
underground. For example, if registering a CDW with a government 
entity necessitated that a labor inspector be able to enter the home 
without notice at any time, employers would be unlikely to comply 
with the registration regulations, and the practice would go unchecked. 
Policies must not demonize employers, who are a crucial component in 
protecting DW’s rights. Some employers, rather than seeing 
themselves as exploiters of cheap child or migrant labor, may consider 
themselves to be helping workers by providing them with a job and 
place to live.310 Their narrative is a crucial one to consider in suggesting 
and implementing policy change. 
A. Basic Rights 
Three main factors contribute to the exploitation of domestic 
workers. First, a lack of regulation in the labor market.311 Second, an 
 
309. C182, supra note 114, preamble. 
310. IDWF, Eight Good Practices, supra 236, at 56 (“[E]mployers believed that providing 
CDWs with food, clothing and shelter was a social service.”). 
311. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 25. See also Bridget Anderson & Julie O’Connell-
Davidson, Int’l Org. for Migration [IOM], Is Trafficking in Human Beings Demand Driven?: A 
Multi-Country Pilot Study, 5 (2003). 
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abundance of vulnerable workers.312 Finally, social norms allowing 
abusive employer behavior.313 Through international obligations 
including ILO Conventions, governments are required both to respect 
rights and to take affirmative obligations to protect DWs from abuses 
by private parties. This affirmative commitment to labor and human 
rights can inform a similar requirement for states to do more to protect 
the fundamental rights of domestic workers in particular. This Part 
provides descriptions of how rights have been interpreted in the past by 
various judicial bodies, and how their application to the context of child 
labor can inform stronger advocacy approaches. These descriptions 
primarily address the first factor contributing to exploitation of 
domestic workers: a lack of regulation in the domestic work industry, 
though they also touch on the second and third. 
1. Forced Labor & Freedom from Economic Exploitation 
Some domestic work can rise to the level of forced labor or 
economic exploitation.314 Where migrant workers live under a 
sponsorship system, they are at increased likelihood of suffering 
abusive employment practices and working conditions that could 
amount to forced labor.315 The system of abuse often starts before a 
domestic worker leaves their home to pursue work: “Fraud, 
misinformation about the nature and terms of work, overcharging or 
theft of recruitment fees, delays in departure or failure to depart 
altogether all make migrant workers more vulnerable to abuse abroad 
and less able to change their situations.”316 These factors are 
exacerbated by the perception of impunity for the actors who violate 
human rights and labor laws. Criminal legal cases concerning 
exploitation in domestic work are scarce.317 
In Siliadin v. France, a case that influenced the adoption of C189, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that a woman was held in 
servitude, in contravention of Article 4 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) against servitude, forced, and compulsory 
 
312. Anderson & O’Connell-Davidson, supra note 311. 
313. Id. 
314. See infra Part IV.A(1). 
315. The Kafala, see supra note 65, at 24-31. 
316. PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 26. 
317. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 26. 
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labor.318 A finding of servitude required ascertaining that there was an 
obligation to perform services for others and an obligation to live on 
another person’s property without the possibility of altering that 
condition.319 Siliadin migrated to France at age fifteen, and was forced 
to work fifteen hours a day, seven days a week.320 She entered France 
to obtain an education, but was forced by her employer/trafficker into 
domestic labor.321 She had no money or resources, and was at the mercy 
of her employers as her identity documents had been confiscated.322 
The Court found that Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom323 imposed an affirmative 
obligation on states to criminalize private conduct that would violate 
the article.324 
Siliadin’s case may be distinguished from the typical migrant 
workers’ as she did not choose to work for her employers, which led to 
the condition of servitude.325 Her case is also distinct because Europe 
has more robust human rights mechanisms than its Asian, African, and 
Middle Eastern counterparts where many DWs work.326 However, the 
approach in Siliadin can inform progress for realization of domestic 
workers rights in other jurisdictions. Though no international human 
rights court exists in either the Middle East or Asia, the UNCRC and 
C182 require action in the domestic context. Because almost all 
countries have agreed to prohibit forced labor and servitude, 
particularly for children, Siliadin can be used as a model for requiring 
that countries criminalize private conduct that would lead to 
exploitation like Siliadin’s. While criminalization itself will not solve 
economic exploitation, it serves a social function by rejecting the 
outdated social practices of forced labor in domestic work and by 
 
318. Siliadin v. France, Case 73316/01 [2005]. 
319. Id. at ¶ 123. (providing that a mandatory ‘live-in’ requirement is common among 
many countries which host MDWs). 
320. Id. at ¶¶ 10-14. 
321. Id. at ¶ 11. 
322. See id. at ¶¶ 11-15. 
323. Now included in the European Human Rights Charter. 
324. Siliadin, supra note 318, at ¶¶ 84-89 (“It necessarily follows from this provision that 
States have positive obligations to adopt criminal law provisions which penalize the practices 
referred to in Article 4 and to apply them in practice.”). 
325. Id. at ¶ 126. 
326. Europe has a Human Rights Convention and Court. Similar bodies include the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and its associated court, and the African People’s 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Neither Asia nor the Middle East has a similar regional 
human rights body or court. 
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setting standards of progressive rights realization in domestic work. 
Even in jurisdictions where Siliadin is not binding, it makes a 
compelling argument that countries that fail to take affirmative 
obligations to eradicate slavery in domestic work will be subject to 
international scrutiny. 
Not all cases will be as severe as Siliadin’s, rising to the level of 
forced servitude. However, a court in a country with a law 
criminalizing forced servitude could similarly find that the right is 
meaningless without government action to enforce the right, and 
therefore encourage countries to act upon their positive obligations to 
prevent servitude and compulsory labor in their territories. 
Highlighting abuse cases of minors such as Siliadin, and linking these 
stories with the prevention of human trafficking can encourage 
governments to work to protect victims, and investigate possible 
situations of trafficking or servitude in domestic work, regardless of the 
age of the victim. This of course, assumes that law enforcement is 
capable of recognizing and investigating coercive and forced labor.327 
A key to addressing the risk of forced labor is by formalizing the 
employment relationship.328 To address concerns of forced labor, the 
ILO and other activists have advocated for written contracts as to 
employment terms, which can lay out clearly the work schedule 
including rest and payment periods.329 Domestic Worker’s unions have 
specifically requested formal work contracts with working conditions 
clearly listed.330 Contracts are equally important for child workers, 
even where employment is short-term or part-time.331 A written 
contract, signed by both parties prior to the commencement of work, 
allows DWs to have proof of the details of their work relationships and 
understand the expectations of the job.332 In the event of a conflict, it 
can serve to elucidate any agency fee arrangements or obligations, 
particularly where the DW was recruited by a chain of agencies or 
 
327. See Case of C.N., supra note 273 (the British police were alerted to the circumstances 
of labor trafficking on a number of occasions, but each time either failed to uncover evidence of 
forced labor or otherwise found that no statute existed that would allow prosecutors to hold CN’s 
trafficker accountable under criminal law). 
328. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 24. 
329. C189, supra note 23, art. 7 (providing that Convention 189 calls for written contracts, 
where possible). 
330. Id. 
331.  Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 78. 
332.  Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 216. 
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subcontractors.333 South Africa requires holistic ‘written particulars of 
the work’, including a brief description of the work, ordinary hours, 
rate of wages and payment method, rate for overtime, any payment in 
kind, leave entitlement, period of notice upon termination, and possible 
wage deductions.334 
In Malawi, CDWs of legal working age have been given formal 
work contracts under an ILO program titled SNAP - ‘Support for the 
National Action Plan’335 - undertaken as part of Malawi’s national 
action plan to combat child labor.336 The Program requires that a young 
domestic worker be presented a formal contract listing working hours 
and conditions, which is signed by the worker, the village chief, a 
representative of child labor monitoring committee and the 
employer.337 The existence of a contract has been reported to help both 
the employees understand their rights and for employers to understand 
what the laws required of them.338 Malawi’s model, designed 
specifically for young workers, could inform a broader approach 
calling for clear contracts for all domestic workers – the contracts don’t 
expire when the workers reach the age of majority. Further, these young 
workers will be empowered to ask for formal work contracts as they 
become adults. 
An additional solution to eradicating forced labor is to legislate, 
implement, and enforce working standards, including minimum wage 
and maximum working hours legislation. To enforce these standards, 
governments must provide a means for detecting abusive employment 
relationships, enabling submission of complaints and mandating 
punishments for those in breach. C189 requires decent living 
conditions and privacy, which should naturally be extended to children 
workers.339 Details about the nature of the living conditions should be 
formalized in the contracts. Ensuring adequate living conditions may 
 
333. Id. at ¶ 493. 
334. Labour Dep’t of S. Africa, What you Should Know, supra note 207. 
335. SNAP is a program funded by the US Department of Labor beginning in 2009. 
336. ILO, Malawi: From Child Labour to Decent Work (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/multimedia/video/institutional-videos/WCMS_
215821/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. C189, supra note 23, art. 4, at 7. 
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require labor inspections, as noted above, to ensure that the facilities 
are as described in the contract.340 
Finally, workers must have a say in determining their living 
situation – a key component of the Court’s finding of compulsive labor 
in Siliadin.341 Live-in employees’ movement and ability to enjoy 
leisure time can be restricted. Lack of social and financial resources 
compound this problem when abuse arises, and the worker has little 
means of escape. Though not all children will be in a position to 
determine their own living situation, they should be made aware of 
alternatives to living and employment arrangements. Therefore, it is 
important that DWs be given options about their living conditions, be 
informed about their rights and options, and be empowered to know 
that they can negotiate with their employers. 
2. Right to Occupational Health 
Domestic workers are prone to a variety of occupational hazards, 
because of both the tasks undertaken and the conditions of work.342 
These are particularly acute for children, who may lack the proper 
education and training necessary to assess these risks and mitigate 
them.343 Under Recommendation 190, which accompanied and 
elaborated on C189, hazardous work includes that which exposes 
children to physical, psychological, or sexual abuse, “hazardous 
substances, agents or processes” and “work under particularly difficult 
conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work 
where the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the 
employer.”344 The last condition directly calls for protections for 
CDWs residing with their employers. R201 also highlights that special 
attention must be given to workers under the age of eighteen by limiting 
their hours of work, including in night work, restricting excessively 
demanding work, and strengthening mechanisms to monitor working 
and living conditions.345 
 
340. See supra Part IV.B(1) on employer privacy & labor inspections. 
341. Cf. Siliadin, supra note 318, ¶¶ 123-29. 
342. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 9. 
343. For more on children in domestic work, see Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 
32. 
344. ILO, Recommendation 190 – Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, II(a)-(e) (June 17, 
1999). 
345. R201, supra note 107, art. V.2.(a)-(d). 
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Domestic workers often use house cleaning chemicals that can 
burn the skin and cause respiratory disorders.346 Tasks such as carrying 
heavy loads, gardening and farming with heavy equipment, cooking 
with hot pans and using irons can be exhausting and dangerous, 
particularly for children or those whom are not getting enough rest 
time.347 Working conditions in domestic work remain sub-standard 
compared to other labor sectors.348 A study in Vietnam reported that 
common illnesses of CDWs included coughs and respiratory problems, 
headaches, back pain and wounds.349 The study found that thirty-six 
percent of children had been wounded or sick during their service.350 
Children in Brazil have reported chronic sleep deprivation, and 
psychosocial disorders such as phobia and separation anxiety, while 
CDWs in Kenya reported bedwetting, insomnia, nightmares, frequent 
headaches, withdrawal and depression.351 
The ILO has called for special protection for young domestic 
workers by limiting their working hours, banning night work, and 
implementing restrictions on work that is excessively demanding.352 
While those three protections are specifically tailored to child workers, 
standard setting in this area can help legislators to view domestic work 
as a human rights and gender concern, informing laws that respect 
domestic workers of all ages.353 To prevent occupational health and 
safety abuses, governments should require basic safety training for all 
individuals entering into domestic work, provided in multiple 
languages. This can be framed in terms of benefits to employers by 
highlighting that trained workers are more efficient and better able to 
contribute to chores.354 Governments could also provide a complaint 
hotline for DWs to call, for example if their employer is refusing to 
provide protective equipment such as gloves for handling toxic 
chemicals. Governments could even go a step further, encouraging or 
 
346. For more on risk factors see See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance 
Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 10; see also Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 33-34. 
347. Id. at 34. 
348. Maria Gallotti & Jesse Mertens, Promoting integration for migrant domestic workers 
in Europe: a synthesis of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, (International Migration Papers no. 
118) (2013). 
349. ILO, Survey report: Child domestic workers in Ho Chi Minh City 13 (2006). 
350. Id. at 49. 
351. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 34. 
352. Id. at 3. 
353. Id. 
354. IDWF, Eight Good Practices, supra note 236, at 60. 
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requiring domestic workers to obtain a certification before being able 
to work. A model rolled out in some provinces of China offers different 
levels of certifications based upon the number of training courses 
completed.355 
Finally, labor inspections of work places could also prove to be 
beneficial for occupational safety and health.356 In 2011, a report from 
the EU Fundamental Rights Agency examined working conditions of 
irregular migrant domestic workers, and concluded that fair working 
conditions should provide for labor inspections.357 Sri Lanka has 
granted authority to its National Child Protection Authority to enter and 
search any premises, including homes, where it believes child abuse is 
occurring.358 
3. Right to Social Security 
Where workers do become sick, it is important that they have 
access to social security benefits, including healthcare, particularly 
where other migrant workers have such benefits.359 As of 2013, the ILO 
estimated that only ten percent of domestic workers worldwide have 
equivalent protections to workers in other industries,360 and many 
countries specifically exclude domestic workers from otherwise 
mandatory social security schemes.361 Voluntary schemes are often 
ineffective. Even where the domestic worker is aware of the scheme, 
they face regulatory hurdles to join it, and may struggle to convince 
their employers to enroll them.362 The ILO reports that when young 
domestic workers fall ill, they risk receiving little or no medical 
 
355. See REPORT – THE STATUS OF DOMESTIC WORKERS AND DECENT WORK 
CHALLENGES IN CHINA 4 (“Along with training and certification systems, the Chinese 
government also urges the industry to make distinctions between different service types, publish 
industry standards, and check workers certificates when recruiting new employees. In 2003, 
Shenzhen published the first industry service standards for domestic workers, including a 
classification of different skill levels and the requirements for attaining each classification. 
Salaries can be increased commiserate with experience”). 
356. See generally, supra Section II.B(1) (discussing employer privacy & labor 
inspections). 
357. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 157. 
358. Tackling Child Labour in Domestic Work, supra note 110, at 78. 
359. Other ILO Conventions list healthcare as a right for migrant workers. See e.g. Int’l 
Labour Org. Convention 97, art. 5.  
360. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 10. 
361. Id. at 20. 
362. Id. 
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treatment, as employers prefer to treat them at home to avoid medical 
costs.363 
Refusing to grant social security and health benefits to domestic 
workers may serve to keep financial costs low for employers, but has 
severe long term costs for workers. The ILO has sought to address lack 
of social security in certain industries by recommending basic income 
security for children, a nationally-defined minimum wage, and access 
to nutrition, education, and care.364 Where possible, domestic workers 
should have equal protections to other workers including coverage by 
social security, pensions and maternity benefits.365 Comparing 
domestic work to a business, an academic noted that “if cost does not 
fall on the employer, it rests with the worker. It is hard to see why 
domestic workers should be subjected to health hazards as part of their 
jobs.”366 
Extending social security benefits to children may be a challenge 
where children workers are considered casual workers or part-time 
ones.367 However, the narrative should be framed in a way that 
employers can see the benefits of such a program. For example, if a 
DW falls ill, under a social security scheme her healthcare costs would 
be more affordable for the employer. This requires educating both DWs 
and their employers as to the benefits of these schemes. Argentina has 
a model of employer contributions that is split into three segments: 
workers over sixteen and under eighteen, those eighteen and over, and 
retired workers.368 The employers of domestic workers between the 
ages of sixteen and eighteen are required to pay into the health 
insurance scheme, but not the pension scheme, limiting their costs.369 
Uruguay’s National Health Insurance System is designed to formalize 
young adult workers.370 The system requires higher contributions for 
 
363. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 29. See also Swept Under the Rug, supra note 
117, at 42.  
364. THE STRATEGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, SOCIAL 
SECURITY FOR ALL: BUILDING SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOORS AND COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL 
SECURITY SYSTEM 53 (2012). 
365. C189, supra note 23, art. 14. 
366. Fredman, supra note 95, at 419. 
367. See generally Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 154, at 21-22 
(discussing social security exclusions).  
368. Id. at 29-30. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. at 30. 
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domestic workers with a spouse or children, allowing costs to remain 
low for young single workers.371 
This is a challenge, however, where DWs are contract workers 
and do not work in a single household. In South Africa, DWs may claim 
unemployment benefits for a fixed period on dismissal if they 
contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, though many 
employers have failed to register their DWs.372 Brazil’s innovative 
solution provides financial incentives to employers who register their 
DWs with National Social Security Institute.373 Brazil’s scheme allows 
social security payments made on behalf of a DW to be deducted from 
the employer’s income tax liability.374 Because many governments 
already have social security schemes for other industries, extending 
such schemes to domestic workers is a reasonable and natural 
progression. Allowing employers to register young workers in 
progressive, and cheaper schemes would encourage compliance. 
4. Right to Remuneration 
Domestic workers have the right to a minimum wage. Low pay or 
no pay is common, particularly among the youngest domestic 
workers.375 Given the difficulty of researching domestic work, many 
studies on child labor are unable to consider it.376 Some domestic 
workers, particularly low-skilled children, are remunerated in-kind 
with accommodation, food or education costs.377 Some employers also 
 
371. Id. 
372. See generally Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, No. 4 of 2002 (S.Afr.) 
(discussing details of South Africa’s insurance fund legislation). For a mention of South Africa’s 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and its extension to domestic workers, see Domestic Workers 
Across the World, supra note 6, at 88; see also Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra 
note 154, at 16. 
373. Fredman, supra note 95, at 408. 
374. Id. 
375. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 16. See also Pyae Thet Phy, 
Domestic Migrant Workers in Thailand, Malaysia ‘Underpaid,’ MYANMAR TIMES, Sep. 29, 
2017, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/domestic-migrant-workers-thailand-malaysia-underpai
d.html [https://perma.cc/7NH3-PNK4]. 
376. See e.g., IPEC-ILO, CHILD LABOUR, CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THE PERPETUATION OF 
POVERTY 11 (Dec. 2007) (domestic work was not considered); see also Scott Lyon & Cristina 
Valdivia, Towards the Effective Measurement of Child Domestic Workers: Building Estimates 
Using Standard Household Survey Instruments (Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) 
Programme, Working Paper Sept. 2010) (suggesting household surveys as a way to overcome 
the information gap). 
377. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶ 23. 
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are reported to implement a non-transparent system of salary 
deductions for healthcare needs, or broken or lost household items.378 
Without a contract, the terms of payment, including when and how 
workers will be paid, can be unclear. 
In Hounga v. Allen, a U.K. Court of Appeals (later overturned) 
determined that Ms. Hounga, who was physically abused and 
dismissed by her employer at age fourteen, was not entitled to salary in 
arrears, because at the relevant time she did not have the right to work 
in the United Kingdom.379 The employment tribunal had earlier found 
that she “knew the difference between right and wrong.”380 This, 
despite that Ms. Hounga was brought to the United Kingdom at the age 
of fourteen by her employer who falsified her documents under the 
pretenses of securing her education, and was never paid her the 
promised wages.381 The case was more troubling as Ms. Hounga had 
low cognitive functioning and emotional difficulties.382 Though Ms. 
Hounga had made misrepresentations on immigration documents, The 
Supreme Court overturned the lower court, finding that Ms. Hounga 
was a trafficking victim and thus was able to pursue her claims against   
the employer who trafficked her into the country.383 
South Africa could inform a workable solution. National law 
requires a maximum of forty-five hours per week, fifteen over time, 
and daily maximum of nine hours per day, governed by a contract.384 
Weekly rest must be thirty-six consecutive hours, and they receive 
twenty-one consecutive days paid annual leave per year, and unpaid 
maternity leave.385 In addition, South Africa, among other countries, 
has prescribed a payment rate for on-call working hours.386 The 
government provides a fill-in contract that includes daily working 
 
378. Id. at ¶ 24. See also As If I Am Not Human, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/14/if-i-am-not-human (“[S]ome employers make arbitrary 
and illegal deductions from salaries as a disciplinary tool, to pay for a worker's medical expenses, 
or to recoup recruitment fees.”) [https://perma.cc/S6SL-3AQF]. 
379. Hounga v. Allen [2014] UKSC 47 (Eng.). 
380. Id. at ¶ 11. 
381. Id. at ¶ 2, 9. 
382. Id. at ¶ 8. 
383.  Id. at ¶ 54.  
384. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 Sectorial Determination 7: Domestic 
Worker Section, S. Afr., 446 GOV’T GAZETTE, No. 23732, §10(a)-(b), 16(1)(b), Aug. 15, 2002 
(covering hours of work and rest periods). 
385. Id. at 17(1)(b).  
386. ILO, Working Hours in Domestic Work 2 (2010). 
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hours with rest time.387 Because the South African Department of 
Labour lacks the capacity to conduct thorough labor inspections, it 
conducts ‘blitzes’ in the domestic work industry.388 Inspectors identify 
households with domestic workers through registers at the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, and through door-to-door checks.389 
Studies conducted in the country have noted that the introduction of a 
minimum wage has increased domestic worker’s wages, though non-
compliance still exists.390 
Though there are examples of multinational corporations settling 
cases against them for abuses of child labor, there appears to be little 
case law involving back pay of child domestic labor. This is certainly 
not because child labor is not abused, but rather due to the practical 
hurdles child workers face in accessing justice. This is a serious area 
where advocacy can be enhanced. To not pay a salary to a worker is to 
possibly render them in a position of forced labor. Where remuneration 
is in-kind, it should be explicitly included in a contract. UNICEF was 
successful in uncovering child domestic workers through a household 
survey, which indicated that some less-wealthy households did not 
report the presence of a CDW.391 Thus, advocacy for a basic wage can 
be targeted at employers, who may not understand that their situation 
amounts to an employment relationship, or who may have little 
incentive to report the employment relationship to authorities. 
5. Trade Union Rights & Right to Freedom of Association 
Child workers in any field lack the organizational capacity to 
bargain collectively with employers, who have much greater 
bargaining power.392 Though there is often an age limit for union 
participation, there have been calls by domestic workers unions to 
allow for the participation of child domestic workers.393 Latin America 
has a strong movement for allowing children domestic workers to 
 
387. LAB. DEP’T OF S. AFR., supra note 207, at 13-14. 
388. DEBBIE BUDLENDERT, THE INTRODUCTION OF A MINIMUM WAGE FOR DOMESTIC 
WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 20 (2016). 
389. Id. at 20. 
390. Id. at 21. 
391. Households hosting CDWs in arrangements disguised as fostering are better off than 
households of children in other forms work, but are much less wealthy than reported employer 
households. Lyon & C. Valdivia, UNICEF, supra note 376, at 13. 
392. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
393.  ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 75. 
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organize themselves.394 Ideally, governments would allow domestic 
workers to form their own unions, as opposed to permitting 
membership in generalized unions. 
As noted by the ILO, “[i]t is a growing feature of trade union 
activities that they focus on a wider range of socio-economic issues that 
concern their members and their families, including child labour.”395 
This is partly because of globalization, but also because of changing 
work environments and the roles and objectives of trade unions. 
Incorporating the goals of CDWs into wider union strategy, and using 
union resources to empower CDWs to represent themselves can 
strengthen the connection between child labor and domestic work. This 
approach could also increase cooperation and coordination between the 
two groups and their advocates. 
Here, recruitment agencies also play an important role, as they are 
often the first point of contact for a domestic worker seeking 
employment. Formal agents can be required to distribute union 
information to workers before they take up employment. For workers 
to have time to engage in union activities, employers must be made 
aware of mandatory rest time, and a mechanism for sanctioning those 
not in compliance must exist. This must be more effective and simple 
than access to a labor tribunal – for example a complaint hotline in 
relevant languages. 
6. Non-discrimination: Right to Gender & Racial Equality 
Changing societal expectations and perceptions of women, the 
poor, and minority communities is crucial to expanding and protecting 
the inherent dignity of DWs. Without access to affordable childcare 
options, greater involvement of men, and/or secure and flexible work, 
women will continue to depend on domestic workers for childcare.396 
That 67.1 percent of the 17.2 million children in paid or unpaid 
domestic work are female frames this squarely as a gender issue. 397 
 
394.  Id. at 59. See also Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 70 (Manthoc in Peru 
and The Bhirma Sanga Association and SUMAPI in the Philippines have successfully developed 
organizations for working children). 
395. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 43. 
396. See Fredman, supra note 95. 
397. ILO, CHILD DOMESTIC WORK: GLOBAL ESTIMATES 2012, 2 (2013). See also 
DemandAT, supra note 5, at 26 (describing demand for domestic work as gendered, racialized 
and ethicized); Tackling Child Labour, supra note 107, at 58-9 (“Gender discrimination is a 
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Further, social attitudes toward domestic workers from lower 
castes or different races can play a role in treatment of domestic 
workers from outside a community. An Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights report on undocumented migrants stated that exclusion 
of undocumented migrants from labor rights breached international 
principles of equality before the law and non-discrimination, both of 
which it recognized as jus cogens norms.398 The status of non-
discrimination as a jus cogens norm highlights the importance of 
working against stereotypes that contribute to discrimination and can 
lead to abuse against migrant workers. These jus cogens labor norms 
of equality and non-discrimination are applicable to vulnerable DWs 
including migrants and children.399 
Domestic workers are prone to gender-based violence, including 
sexual assault and harassment, and multiple layers of discrimination in 
the labor market including exclusion from social protections such as 
reproductive healthcare.400 A study of child domestic work in 
Bangladesh found that for age groups twelve to eighteen, female 
domestic workers suffered ‘bad behavior’ at the hands of employers at 
a higher rate than males.401 A solution to the ‘feminization of poverty’ 
is the economic empowerment of women. Because poverty is a 
commonality among domestic workers, DWs are likely to be struggling 
financially and more likely to send their own children into the labor 
force as DWs.402 However, only by influencing social change and 
attitudes toward women and minorities can advocates limit 
discrimination in the domestic work industry. Reframing the struggle 
for better rights protection under gender equality and equal protection 
could draw more attention to the abuses in the domestic work industry. 
 
major cause of child domestic labour” and “a significant number of child domestic workers come 
from tribal and ethnic minorities or the lower castes or classes.”). 
398. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
399. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 155. 
400. For more on gender-based violence, see supra Part II.V. See also U.N. Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comments, 37th Sess., supra note 175, at 79 (interpreting the right to 
health as including reproductive freedom). 
401. Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 57. 
402. See MARKIE, supra note 213; Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 28, 53 
(“Poverty is the main reason why children work.”). 
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7. Right to Equal Treatment under the Law and Equality with 
Locals in Legal Proceedings 
Access to equal justice under the law is necessary for DWs to 
assert their labor, contractual, treaty and international rights.403 
However, in some systems, migrant workers are explicitly excluded 
from accessing public or legal aid available to locals.404 In some cases, 
migrants are categorized and some denied access to rights that other 
migrant workers have.405 More commonly, structural hurdles create de 
facto inequality.406 Challenges in accessing justice for both migrants 
and children may include language skills, inability to pay fees or living 
expenses while pursuing a case, and lack of understanding of the legal 
system.407 
Where migrant workers are living in a foreign country under a 
sponsorship system, they may resist bringing legal complaints due to 
realistic fears of retaliation, deportation, or an employer withholding 
their permission for a worker to leave the country.408 This risk is 
heightened when a workers’ travel documents are confiscated.409 
Though children who migrate internally for work do not always 
fear the same types of abuses due to language or their immigration 
status, they face similar, if not greater, structural difficulties accessing 
justice. CDW consulting groups have specifically requested greater 
assistance in times of crisis, including seeking redress from abusive or 
exploitative working conditions.410 Migrants and children should have 
both de jure and de facto equal access to the justice system, and fees 
 
403. ILO, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), art. 6(1)(d) 
(Jan. 22, 1952); PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 24 (discussing access to justice). 
404. For example, in the United States, some documented migrant workers under 
particular visa schemes are excluded from accessing legal aid. Laura K. Abel & Risa E. 
Kaufman, Preserving Aliens’ and Migrant Workers’ Access to Civil Legal Services: 
Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491 (2003). 
405. Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at 154. 
406. For example, in Hong Kong, a ‘two-week rule’ requires domestic workers to leave 
the territory within two weeks after being terminated, which creates a temporal barrier to rights 
assertion. New Condition of Stay (NCS) (1987) (H.K). 
407. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67. 
408. See The Kafala, supra note 65, at 36; Ricard-Guay, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that 
“tied-visa system reinforced vulnerability to abuses”). 
409. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212 (confiscation of documents is a medium 
indicator of forced labour). 
410. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 4. 
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should not be so high as to discourage complaints.411 Where 
appropriate, DWs should also have access to conciliation or mediation. 
It is unreasonable to expect migrant workers to enforce their rights by 
using the court system without providing them with specific 
assistance.412 Governments can improve access by providing translated 
or simplified court documents, in-court translators, and public aid for 
civil suits. Pro-active governments could provide rights training as part 
of a qualification for undertaking domestic work. Such training need 
not be equivalent for children and adults, but could take very basic 
forms for child workers, and enhanced work training could be made 
available for adult workers or those seeking to work abroad. 
B. Rights not Applicable 
While the overlap between child and adult DWs within a rights-
based framework is overwhelming, there are a few areas in which the 
groups are distinct. These include the right to abode, the right to 
residence in case of loss of employment, and maternity rights. Though 
minors may qualify for a temporary residency visa where they have 
been trafficked across international borders, it is unlikely that such 
protections would be extended to migrant workers who are willingly, 
and temporarily, taking up work in another country. In some countries, 
fear of migrant workers permanently settling in their host country has 
been used as a justification for denial of rights.413 Similarly, because of 
complex implications for immigration policy, it is unlikely that States 
would be eager to grant migrant workers rights to temporary or 
permanent residence for the purposes of finding a new employer. 
There will certainly be instances of women under the age of 
eighteen becoming pregnant while undertaking domestic work. 
However, stereotypes of and attitudes toward women who become 
pregnant at a young age will likely make advocating for maternity 
rights for children a controversial advocacy point. Maternity rights are 
 
411. ILO, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), art. 
9(2) (Dec. 9, 1978); ILO, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), art. 
6(1)(d) (Jan. 22, 1952). 
412.  Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms in the Domestic Work Sector 
Introductory Guide, at 17 (2016).  
413. Will Labor Reforms in the UAE Improve Life For Migrant Domestic Workers?, 
WORLD POL. REV., Apr. 26, 2017. 
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thus best advocated for in conjunction with improved social protection 
for adult DWs. 
C. Using a Rights-Based Advocacy Framework 
Though social attitudes toward domestic workers and the 
abundance of easily exploitable workers are difficult to change in 
practice, policy-makers do have the ability to limit the exploitation of 
domestic workers by improving industry oversight.414 While activities 
occurring within the home were once outside the sphere of regulation, 
states are increasingly willing to oversee them, for example, in the case 
of domestic violence. Despite the complexities of oversight, 
governments are recognizing that they have affirmative legal 
obligations to protect workers within their territory, even where those 
obligations regulate and criminalize private conduct.415 
Advocates for domestic workers need to solidify the ties between 
better work standards for DWs and the eradication of the worst forms 
of child labor. Focusing on the human rights overlap between child 
labor and domestic work can help to achieve three broad goals: 
ratifying C189, holding states to account for failures under C182 and 
the UNCRC to protect rights that they have agreed to abide by, and 
developing domestic legislation to protect the rights of domestic 
workers. 
First, advocates across the domestic work industry must work 
together to continue to push for ratification of C189. As opposed to the 
concrete requirements in R201, C189 uses aspirational language, which 
means that states have few reporting obligations or binding targets. 
C189 is thus left to be interpreted in light of the local context.416 
Drawing upon the human rights overlap between domestic work and 
the worst forms of child labor can aid in this push by allowing states to 
address the most pressing needs first. Origin countries of MDWs that 
are already signatories to C189 can encourage destination countries 
 
414. The unregulated nature of the domestic labor industry is one of three factors creating 
exploitative conditions pinpointed by studies on domestic worker and sex work industries, both 
of which are rife with instances of human trafficking. The other two are abundant supply of 
exploitable labor and the malleability of social norms between the employers and employees. 
Anderson & O’Connell-Davidson, supra note 311, at 5. 
415. See Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 158. An 
additional example of this is the increasing recognition that domestic violence falls within the 
purview of the criminal law. 
416. Sharon L. Fawcett, Child Labor in Domestic Work, STOP CHILD LABOR (Sep. 10, 
2013), http://stopchildlabor.org/?p=3643 [https://perma.cc/UQ8L-WYMW]. 
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with whom they have a labor exchange relationship to ratify. The 
emotive appeal of ending child labor in domestic work and the desire 
for strong labor exchange relationships can help in this regard. 
Second, states are obligated to meet certain basic standards under 
the UNCRC and C182. Advocates can utilize the binding frameworks 
provided for in these agreements to attack lackluster regulation of the 
domestic work industry. As the European Court of Human Rights 
found in Siliadin and N.C., States have an affirmative duty to 
criminalize exploitative labor in their territories.417 Domestic worker 
unions and civil society groups can strengthen submissions to the ILO 
under C182’s biennial reporting requirement where they can link a 
country’s failure to protect domestic workers with child labor abuses. 
Finally, this approach can inform a basis for encouraging 
legislation at a domestic level, even in countries that have not ratified 
C189. This can be accomplished through advocacy, lobbying, media 
campaigns and public shaming of countries with poor records of 
protecting children from the worst forms of domestic work. When 
legislators understand the inherent link between abusive child labor and 
domestic work, they may be more open to passing protective legislation 
covering the domestic work industry. In addition to encouraging 
legislation, advocacy groups could ask for non-binding measures, such 
as a Code of Conduct for government agencies and employers to utilize 
in hiring and employing domestic workers, to be distributed to 
community centers in urban communities where DWs may work. Such 
a document could draw on the principles of C182 and C189 without 
becoming binding law, paving the way for more binding instruments in 
the future. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite growing awareness of the necessity to regulate the 
industry, DWs remain legislatively and socially vulnerable. This Note 
has strengthened the connection between abusive child labor practices 
and domestic work using a human rights-based framework. Part II 
defined domestic work within its historical context as informal, 
feminine care work. Part III discussed the international conventions 
and laws most relevant to DWs, including children involved in 
domestic work. Part IV highlighted why the industry remains 
 
417 See supra Part VI.A.1.  
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challenging to regulate and thus why domestic workers remain socially 
and legislatively vulnerable. Part V discussed the factors shared by 
child and adult DWs that increase a worker’s risk of labor exploitation. 
Part VI elaborated on the human rights applicable to all domestic 
workers, and advocated a rights-based framework for regulating the 
domestic work industry. This Part argued that rights-based advocacy is 
an appropriate method to strengthen legislative protection for domestic 
workers. 
Within a rights-based framework, it is clear that states continue to 
fall severely short in their duty to protect the human rights of domestic 
workers. Because the domestic work industry contains some of the 
most abusive child labor practices, states must regulate it to comply 
with their international legal obligations. Pulling women and their 
children out of poverty provides a compelling economic reason to do 
so. Further, and more simply, states must adopt a more compassionate 
approach to labor policies for domestic workers. It is my hope that by 
doing this, states can better recognize the important contributions that 
domestic workers make to our communities and economies, and 
respect that contribution in both rhetoric and action. 
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